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CHAPTER I 
 
DEBT-EQUITY SUBSTITUTION, GROWTH OPTIONS AND MARKET TIMING 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A large number of studies find that corporate financing activities predict future stock 
returns. For capital raising activities, firms are found to underperform their stock return 
benchmarks after initial public offerings (Ritter (1991)), seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and 
Ritter (1995)), public debt offerings (Spiess and Affleck-Garves (1999)) and bank borrowings 
(Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2001)). For capital distribution activities, previous studies find 
firms earn abnormally high stock returns after stock repurchases (Ikenberry, Lankonishok and 
Vermaelen (1995)). A recent study by Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) examines the 
commonalities among various financing anomalies. Using the statement of cash flows data, they 
develop a comprehensive measure of corporate financing activities. They show that the net 
amount of cash generated by corporate financing activities is a more powerful predictor of future 
stock returns than individual categories of financing activities. They thus suggest that the various 
financing anomalies are part of a broader net financing effect.  
There has been much debate about whether financing anomalies are consistent with the 
mispricing hypothesis or with the efficient market hypothesis. From the mispricing perspective, 
financing anomalies occur because firms tend to issue new securities when they are overvalued 
(Bradshaw, Richarson and Sloan (2006), Loughran and Ritter (1996), Ritter (1991)). Issuers earn 
lower returns when mispricing is corrected in subsequent periods. Supporters of the efficient 
market perspective argue that the lower stock returns earned by issuers reflect investors’ rational 
expectations. A particular strand of the efficient market explanation argues that equity and debt 
issuers earn lower average returns because they use the proceeds to finance new investment (Li, 
2 
 
Livdan and Zhang (2009), Liu, Whited and Zhang (2009) and Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2007)). 
These authors argue that the negative relation between external financing and future stock return 
simply reflects the negative relation between investment and expected return. They base their 
argument on either the q-theory of investment (Cochrane (1991)) or the real options theory 
(Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004)). According to the q-theory of investment, firms invest 
more when marginal q is higher and marginal q is higher when the discount rate is lower. 
According to the real options theory, investment converts risky growth options into real assets. 
Since real assets are less risky than growth options, firms’ required rates of return decrease after 
investment. Therefore, both the q-theory of investment and the real options theory imply a 
negative relation between real investment and future stock returns. 
Several recent studies find empirical evidence in support of the investment based theories. 
In one of the studies, Lyandres, Sun and Zhang (2007) show that an investment factor, long in 
low-investment stocks and short in high-investment stocks, helps explain the new issues puzzle. 
While their findings are consistent with the investment based theories, it is not clear whether 
mispricing plays a role in driving the negative relation between investment and future stock 
returns
1
. In another study, Butler, Cornaggia, Grullon and Weston (hereafter referred to as 
BCGW (2010)) more explicitly test the mispricing hypothesis against the investment based 
theories through a debt-equity substitution hypothesis. They argue that market timers should 
strategically substitute equity for debt when they expect low future stock returns. Consequently, 
equity issuers should earn lower future stock returns than debt issuers if the market timing 
hypothesis holds.  However, they find that future stock return is negatively related only to the 
level of external financing, but not to the debt-equity composition of external financing. They 
thus conclude that the data do not support the mispricing hypothesis. In addition to this firm level 
                                                          
1
 For example, Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) argue that investors misprice firms that substantially increase capital 
investments because they do not fully anticipate the empire building implications of increased investment expenditures. 
It is also possible that market mispricing simultaneously affects firms’ financing and investment decisions. For example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that, when firms’ stocks are overvalued, managers are more likely to make stock 
financed acquisitions. It can even be argued that firms may pursue additional investment projects simply because they 
need an excuse for issuing more securities at favorable prices.   
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study, several other papers have examined whether firms’ debt-equity issuance choices predict 
aggregate stock market returns (Baker and Wurgler (2000), Baker , Taliaffrro and Wurgler (2006), 
Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005), Welch and Goyal (2007), etc). 
A potential concern over these studies is that they do not control for the risk 
characteristics of new investments. Supporters for the investment-based explanations tend to 
assume that firms use the proceeds from external financing activities to invest in real assets, 
neglecting the possibility that they can also use the proceeds to develop more growth options. 
Firms become riskier when their growth options increase relative to their real asset bases. 
Investors will require higher rates of returns for holding the equities of these firms. Moreover, 
capital structure studies suggest that firms are more likely to use equity than debt to finance new 
growth options
2
. Therefore, when firms indeed invest in new growth options, there can be a 
positive correlation between equity financing and future stock return, exactly the opposite to what 
the market timing theory suggests.  If the market timing time effect and the confounding 
investment-in-growth-options effect both exist in the data, one effect cannot be easily detected 
without controlling for the other.  
In this paper, we consider threes alternative procedures for testing the debt-equity 
substitution hypothesis. First, we investigate whether investors are more negatively surprised by 
equity issuers than by debt issuers at subsequent earnings announcements. Second, we examine 
the relation between firms’ debt-equity choices and year-ahead stock returns after controlling for 
the investment-in-growth-options effect. Third, we examine whether analysts’ forecasts of long 
term growth rates are more overoptimistic for heavy equity issuers than for heavy debt issuers. 
We find that the results from all three tests support the mispricing hypothesis. 
                                                          
2 Equity financing is the preferred method for developing new growth options due to concerns over collateral value, 
underinvestment costs (Myers (1977)) and agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)). Hovokimian, Opler and 
Titman (2001) suggest that ‘ﬁrms should use relatively more debt to ﬁnance assets in place and relatively more equity 
to ﬁnance growth opportunities’’. Barclay, Smith and Morellac (2006) further show that, if debt capacity is deﬁned as 
the incremental debt optimally associated with an additional asset, the debt capacity of growth options is negative. 
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The earnings announcement test is our main testing procedure. From the mispricing 
perspective, more overvalued firms will issue more equity relative to debt to exploit market 
mispricing. Consequently, investors will be more negatively surprised by heavy equity issuers 
than by heavy debt issuers at subsequent earnings announcements. Therefore, if the mispricing 
hypothesis holds, firms issuing more equity relative to debt should earn lower event returns at 
subsequent earnings announcements than those issuing more debt relative to equity. The 
investment based theories makes no such predictions. According to the investment based theories, 
investors are surprised by neither the equity issuers nor the debt issuers.  They provide no clear 
reason why investors will be more negatively surprised by heavy equity issuers than by heavy 
debt issuers. We focus on earnings announcement returns to enhance the statistical power of our 
tests. Realized stock returns reflect both investors’ expectations and surprises to investors. 
Several authors argue that the surprises to investor tend to cluster around earnings announcements, 
while the expected components should be distributed more smoothly over the year (e.g., Sloan 
(1996), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Titman, Wei and Xie (2004), Cooper, 
Gullen, Schill (2008))
3
. Since market mispricing is closely related to the surprises to investors, 
the earnings announcement test is potentially a more powerful test for the market timing 
hypothesis, especially for situations where confounding effects may exist in expected returns.  
Several previous studies have examined earnings announcement returns in search for 
evidence of mispricing. For example, La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) use this 
method to examine whether the value premium can be attributed to the expectational errors made 
by investors. More relevant to financing anomalies, several other studies find evidence of 
significantly negative stock price reactions to earnings announcements after equity issues 
(Rangan (1998) and Jegadeesh (1998)). Notice that negative stock price reactions to earnings 
announcements, by themselves, are not sufficient to prove the mispricing hypothesis because 
                                                          
3 We use this argument only for explaining why the earnings announcement test has more statistical power for testing 
the mispricing hypothesis. For reasons that we will explain shortly afterwards, we do not use the concentration of stock 
return effects at earnings announcements as the criterion for identifying anomalies. 
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there is also an expected return component in earnings announcement returns
4
. These studies 
generally base their statistical inferences on the “concentration argument”. That is, they argue that 
stock return effects that are highly concentrated at earnings announcements are likely to be 
anomalies. However, it is not clear what the threshold concentration level should be for 
indentifying anomalies. Moreover, Wu, Zhang and Zhang (2009) show that stock return is 
identical to return on assets in their q theory based model. They thus argue that, in their model, it 
is natural for expected return to be realized around earnings announcements when earnings news 
is released to the market. Therefore, the traditional “concentration argument” may not work when 
one of the alternative hypotheses is related the q-theory of investment. Our statistical inference 
does not rely on the “concentration argument”. By focusing on firms’ debt-equity choices, we 
form testable hypothesis for separating the market timing story from investment based theories. In 
this sense, our test specification will provide more reliable evidence regarding financing 
anomalies than previous earnings announcement studies do.  
We start our earnings announcement tests from a two way sort of raw and benchmark-
adjusted earnings announcement returns (EARs) by the level and debt-equity composition of 
external financing. Following BCGW (2010), we use equity ratio as the proxy for firms’ debt-
equity choices. Equity ratio is defined as the proportion of equity in the net amount of cash raised 
(distributed) during the year. Capital raising (distributing) firms with higher equity ratios issue 
(repurchase) more equity relative to debt. For each year, we sort capital raising (distributing) 
firms into portfolios first by net external financing (NF) and then by equity ratio (ER). We then 
examine how the EARs vary across the NF × ER portfolios. We find capital raising firms with 
higher ER (i.e., firms issuing more equity relative to debt) earn lower returns at the subsequent 
earnings announcements. As discussed earlier, this is consistent with the mispricing hypothesis. 
The negative relation between EARs and ER is confirmed by cross-sectional regression results. 
                                                          
4 Firm characteristics that are often viewed as capturing risks, such as size, book-to-market ratio and momentum, are 
also significantly negatively related to earnings announcement returns. 
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The regression coefficients indicate that, controlling for the level of net external financing, size, 
book-to-market ratio, momentum, asset growth (investment) and ROA, a hedge portfolio formed 
by shorting the capital-raising firms in the highest ER decile and longing those in the lowest ER 
decile generate 1.64% in abnormal return over the subsequent four earnings announcements. In 
comparison, a hedge portfolio formed by longing and shorting extreme book-to-market ratio 
deciles generates 1.50% in abnormal return over the four earnings announcements. This 
comparison shows that earnings announcement effects associated with firms’ debt-equity choices 
are of similar economic magnitude as the well-known book-to-market effect. These results 
suggest that heavy equity issuers have significantly lower earnings announcement returns than 
heavy debt issuers.  
Our earnings announcement test results suggest that investors are systematically more 
negatively surprised by heavy equity issuers than by heavy debt issuers. This is consistent with 
the mispricing hypothesis, but in inconsistent with BCGW’s (2010) findings. To reconcile our 
earnings announcement test results with the findings by BCGW (2010), we examine the relation 
between year-ahead stock returns and equity ratios, with and without controlling for the 
investment-in-growth-options effect. If our conjectures about the market timing effect and the 
investment-in-growth-options effect hold, we expect to obtain different results before and after 
controlling for the investment-in-growth-options effect. We sort firms into portfolios first by NF 
and then by ER and examine how the raw and benchmark-adjusted 12-month buy-and-hold 
returns (BHARs) vary across the NF×ER portfolios. The benchmark-adjusted BHARs are defined 
as raw BHARs minus the mean BHARs of firms with similar size, book-to-market ratio and 
momentum. Consistent with BCGW (2010), we find no difference in benchmark-adjusted 
BHARs across the equity ratio portfolios before controlling for the investment-in-growth-options 
effect. To control for the investment-in-growth-options effect, we use R&D expenditures as the 
proxy for firms’ propensities to invest in growth options. It should be emphasized that R&D 
spending, intuitive as it is, is only a partial control for investment-in-growth-options effect 
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because not all growth options are R&D related. In this sense, the evidence in this paper only 
provides very conservative estimates of the abnormal returns associated with firms’ debt-equity 
choices. However, our objective is not to obtain precise point estimates of the abnormal returns 
associated with firms’ debt-equity choices, but to verify whether different conclusions about the 
mispricing hypothesis can be reached before and after including a partial control for the 
investment in growth options. We examine how the BHARs vary by NF and ER after excluding 
from the portfolios firms with R&D expenditures higher than 5% of lagged assets.  These high 
R&D firms are firms among which the investment-in-growth-options effect is likely to be the 
strongest. Once these firms are excluded from the sample, we find the raw and benchmark-
adjusted BHARs differ between the ER portfolios in the way predicted by the mispricing 
hypothesis. We obtain similar results from cross-sectional regressions. Without controlling for the 
investment-in-growth-options effect, the regression results suggest there is no relation between 
equity ratio and future stock return. However, once we include R&D as a control variable, the 
relation between equity ratio and future stock return is reliably negative for the capital raising 
firms. The effect is robust to the inclusion of various control variables, such as the level of net 
external financing, size, book-to-market, momentum, asset growth and ROA. Therefore, after 
controlling for the investment-in-growth-options effect, both the portfolio sorts analysis and 
cross-sectional regression analysis detect evidence for the mispricing hypothesis.  
In our analysis, we find R&D expenditure is significantly positively related to year-ahead 
stock returns. On average, high R&D firms earn 8.55% more per annum than low R&D firms. 
However, R&D expenditure is not significantly related to earnings announcement returns. 
Following the argument in previous earnings announcement studies (e.g., Sloan (1996) and La 
Portfa, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), these results suggest that the higher year-ahead 
returns on R&D are more likely to be the rationally expected components of stock returns than 
the surprises to investors. This is consistent with the view that investors require higher returns for 
holding the equities of high R&D firms (Berk, Green and Naik (2004) and Li (forthcoming)). 
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More importantly, these findings suggest that the market timing effect, relative to the investment-
in-growth-options effect, is stronger on the earnings announcement days than during other times 
of the year. This explains why the earnings announcement test can detect evidence for market 
timing without controlling for R&D.  
In search for further evidence of mispricing, we examine the relation between equity ratio 
and analysts’ forecasts of firms’ long term growth rates. Previous research suggests that 
expectational errors in long term growth rates play an important role in stock market 
predictability (e.g., Dechow and Sloan (1997) and La Porta (1996)). Since the results from both 
the earnings announcement test and the year-ahead stock return test support the mispricing 
hypothesis, we expect that analysts make more overoptimistic forecasts about heavy equity 
issuers’ growth prospects than about heavy debt issuers’ growth prospects. We find evidence 
consistent with our expectations. While analysts are overoptimistic about both heavy equity 
issuers and heavy debt issuers, they overestimate the growth prospects of the former more than 
they overestimate the growth prospects of the latter by 4.84% to 10.76% per annum.  
Putting together, our results suggest that two opposite relations exist between firms’ debt-
equity choices and future stock returns. Because of managerial market timing, equity financing is 
more negatively related to future abnormal returns than debt financing is. At the same time, there 
can be a positive correlation between equity financing and expected returns when firms use 
equity as the preferred method for financing growth options. Previous studies generally neglect 
the latter effect. This could be one of the reasons why they reach conflicting conclusions about 
equity market timing. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that equity share in new 
issues, an aggregate market timing variable similar to the equity ratio used in this paper, has 
predictive power for future stock market returns. BCGW (2010) find that Baker and Wurgler’s 
(2006) results no longer hold after adding years after 1997 into the sample. Our descriptive 
statistics show that the proportion of high R&D firms (i.e., firms among which the confounding 
effect is the strongest) in our sample increase over the years. As the number of high R&D firms 
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increase, the investment-in-growth-options effect strengthens at the aggregate level and 
eventually completely offsets the market timing effect in the data.  
Knowing that the mispricing effect exists beyond the investment-based theories also has 
important implications for capital structure studies. A large number of capital structure studies 
report evidence of market timing in firms’ debt-equity choices and/or examine whether firms 
undo previous market timing activities (Baker and Wurgler (2005), Alti (2006), Leary and 
Roberts (2005), Kayhan and Titman (2007)). In their survey on capital structure studies, Frank 
and Goyal (2007) suggest that the issue is not whether market conditions affect leverage decisions, 
but how persistent the market timing effects are. If the market timing effect does not survive the 
investment based theories, there will be no need to study the persistence of the market timing 
effects. Our findings provide reassuring evidence about equity market timing.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and descriptive 
statistics. Section 3 discusses the results of the earnings announcement tests. Section 4 presents 
the evidence regarding the relation between debt-equity composition, growth options and year-
ahead stock returns. Section 5 examines the relation between debt-equity composition and 
analysts’ forecasts of firms’ long term growth rates. Section 6 explains how the new growth 
options effect can explain the controversy about aggregate market timing.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
We obtain stock return data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. Our initial 
sample includes all non-financial firms that are listed on NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex at the end of 
each June from 1972 to 2009.  ARDs, REITs, closed-end funds, and other stocks that do not have 
a CRSP share type code of 10 or 11 are excluded from the sample. We follow the standard 
practice of matching the firm-year observations for June of calendar year t with the accounting 
information for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t – 1. To mitigate backfilling biases, we 
10 
 
require that a firm be listed on Compustat for two years before including it in the dataset (Fama 
and French (1993)). Since our goal is to test the debt-equity substitution hypothesis, we require 
that sample firms have Compustat data available for calculating the external financing variables.  
Following Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006), we use net external financing (NF) 
as a comprehensive measure of the firms’ financing activities. The net external financing variable 
is calculated as  
                                                                                                                         
Net equity issue is the net amount of cash from issuing and repurchasing equities (SSTK-
PRSTKC) during the year. Net debt issue is the net amount of cash from issuing and repurchasing 
debt securities (DLTIS - DLTR) during the year
5
. The net external financing, net equity issue and 
net debt issue variables are scaled by average total assets. Following BCGW (2010), we calculate 
equity ratio  (ER) as 
                                                                                                    
Capital raising (distributing) firms with higher equity ratio issue (repurchase) more equity relative 
to debt. This variable can thus be used as a proxy for firms’ equity market timing activities. One 
potential concern over the equity ratio variable is that it can be a noisy measure for market timing 
incentives when firms issue only a small amount of debt or equity. For example, a firm can have 
an equity ratio of 100% if it issues no debt and its employees exercise a small number of options.  
Similarly, it can have an equity ratio of 0 if it issues no equity but a small amount of debt to 
finance its routine operations. In neither case does the ratio reflect managers’ incentives to time 
the market. For this reason, we impose an additional requirement that sample firms issue 
(repurchase) debt or equity that amounts to at least 1% of their lagged assets. By so doing, we 
exclude the observations with potentially the noisiest equity ratios. Moreover, when the issue size 
is large, managers are likely to pay more attention to whether the firms are under- or over-valued 
                                                          
5 Following Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006), we set change in current debt (DLTR) to 0 if the variable has a 
missing value in the Compustat database. 
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by the market in making their debt-equity choices. In this sense, this additional requirement 
enhances the power of our test for detecting market timing activities. The resulting sample 
consists of 93,922 observations over the 38 years between 1972 and 2009. 
Another concern over the equity ratio is that it may not have a one-to-one relation with 
future stock returns. Suppose two issuers have the same equity ratio of, say, 25%. The issue size 
as a percentage of asset base is 1% for one firm and 20% for another. It is unlikely the same 
equity ratio has the same effect on the future stock returns of the two firms. The economic 
magnitude of stock return effects associated with the equity ratio, if any, is likely to be much 
larger for the relatively larger issue.  To address this concern, we use the rank of the equity ratio 
in regressions. Following Mashruwalaa, Rajgopala, and Shevli (2006), we rank firms into deciles 
each year by their equity ratio and then transform the decile rankings to a value between -0.5 and 
0.5 (hereafter referred to as ER
dec
).
6
 The major conclusions do not change when percentile 
rankings are used. The decile ranking takes the value of 0.5 when a firm is in the highest equity 
ratio decile and -0.5 when a firm is in the lowest equity ratio decile. When stock returns are 
regressed on this variable, the coefficient can be interpreted as the return on a hedge portfolio 
formed by longing the firms in the highest equity ratio decile and shorting those in the lowest 
equity ratio decile. 
For each firm-year observation at the June of year t, we calculate its 12-month buy-and-
hold stock return (BHAR) from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Following the procedures used 
by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) and Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler (2010), 
we form benchmark groups for our sample firms based on size, book-to-market (BM) and 
                                                          
6 We transform the ER decile ranking to a value between -0.5 and 0.5 rather than to a value between 0 and 1 because 
we use the interaction terms between POSNF (NEGNF) and ER decile ranking in our regressions. POSNF and NEGNF 
are indicator variables that take the value of one for firms with positive (negative) net external financing and 0 
otherwise. If we transform equity ratio decile to a value between 0 and 1, the coefficients for the interaction terms will 
be difficult to interpret in some situations. For examples, the interaction term between POSNF and ER decile ranking 
will be 0 for three types of firms: firms with ER decile ranking of 0 and POSNF of 0, firms with ER decile ranking of 1 
and POSNF of 0 and firms with ER decile ranking of 0 and POSNF of 1. This will reduce the statistical power of our 
tests. 
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momentum (MOM). 
7
 If a stock is delisted during the 12 month period, we invest the delisting 
proceeds evenly into other stocks in the same size × BM × MOM group. We use both raw and 
benchmark-adjusted BHARs in our portfolio sort analysis. The benchmark-adjusted BHAR is 
calculated as the raw BHAR minus the average BHAR of a size × BM × MOM benchmark group.  
For earnings announcement tests, we match each firm-year observation at the June of 
year t to the earnings announcements that occur between July of year t and June of year t + 1 and 
then calculate the three day buy-and-hold earnings announcement return (EAR) for each event. 
Again, we use both raw and benchmark-adjusted EARs in our portfolio sort analysis. The 
benchmark-adjusted EAR is defined as the raw EAR minus the average EAR for stocks of similar 
size, book-to-market ratio and momentum that announce earnings in the same calendar quarter. 
Ideally, each sample firm will be matched to four earnings announcements during the 12 month 
period. However, for several reasons, some of the firm-year observations are matched to more or 
less than four earnings announcements. First, due to fiscal year change, one earning 
announcement date may correspond to different fiscal periods for some of the stocks. We exclude 
these duplicate observations from the sample. Second, some firms may announce first quarter 
(fourth quarter) earnings announcements earlier (later) than other firms typically do. In this case, 
a sample firm may have more than one earnings announcements in a particular calendar quarter. 
Counting the same firm twice may not be desirable for analyzing earnings announcement effect 
or for calculating benchmark EARs. We handle the situation by keeping only the first earnings 
announcement for any particular quarter. Third, for about two hundred earnings announcements, 
stocks are delisted during the earnings announcement window. We account for delisting returns in 
calculating EARs. In addition, if a stock is delisted on the announcement day, we use the average 
                                                          
7 Each June, we sort all NYSE firms into quintiles by size. Then we divide each of the size portfolios into quintiles by 
book-to-market ratio (BM). Then we divide each of the size × BM portfolios into quintiles by momentum (MOM).  
Size is defined as the market value of equity at the end of June in year t. BM is defined the book equity as of fiscal year 
end that occurs in year t – 1 scaled by the market value of equity at the end of December in year t – 1.  Mom is defined 
as the stock return from July of year t – 1 to May of year t. Using these NYSE breakpoints, we divide all NYSE, 
Nasdaq and Amex stocks into 125 size × BM × MOM benchmark groups.   
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third day return for stocks of similar size, book-to-market ratio and momentum that announce 
earnings in the same calendar quarter as the stock return for day D + 1.  
In our analysis, we also examine the relation between equity ratio and market 
expectations of firms’ long term EPS growth rates. We use the mean analysts’ forecasts of long 
term EPS growth rates (LTG) from the summary statistics file of the I/B/E/S database as the 
proxy for consensus forecasts. A large number of studies find that analysts’ forecasts are 
systemically biased upward. Moreover, Dechow and Sloan (1997)  find that analysts’ forecasts of 
long term EPS growth are more opportunistic for firms with lower book-to-market or earnings-to-
price ratios. We thus calculate benchmark-adjusted LTG for portfolio sort analysis. Again, the 
benchmark-adjusted LTG is defined as raw LTG minus the average LTG of firms with similar 
size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. 
In Table 1.1, we present the descriptive statistics for the sample firms. For the entire 
sample, the net external financing (NF) variable has a mean of 0.0686 and a median of 0.0178. In 
comparison, BCGW (2010) report a mean of 0.06 and a median of 0.01. Our numbers are slightly 
higher, probably because we impose the additional requirement that that sample firms issue 
(repurchase) debt or equity securities that amounts to at least 1% of lagged assets. The statistics 
for the equity ratio (ER) variable cannot be directly compared across studies: BCGW winsorize 
the variable at 0 and 1 while we winsorize the variable at 1% and 99%. Based on the distribution 
of the variable in our sample, about 36% of the observations lie outside the 0 - 1 boundary.  Table 
1.1 also presents the descriptive statistics for several other variables that are used in our analysis. 
MV is the market value of equity (in thousands of dollars) at the end of June in year t. BM is the 
book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity as of the fiscal year end that occurs in 
calendar year t -1 scaled by the market value of equity at the end of December of calendar year t – 
1. MOM is the stock return momentum, defined as the 11 month buy-and-hold return from the 
July of year t – 1 to May of year t. Growth is the change in total assets scaled by lagged assets. 
ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by lagged book assets. R&D is research and  
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Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample firms. The sample firms consist of all non-financial firms 
that are listed on NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex at the end of June each year from 1972 to 2009. NF is net external financing, 
defined as the net amount of cash from issuing and repurchasing debt and equity securities scaled by average assets. ER 
is equity ratio, defined as the proportion of net equity to net cash raised. MV is the market value of equity at the end of 
June in year t. BM is book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity as of the fiscal year ending in calendar 
year t -1 scaled by the market value of equity at the end of calendar year t – 1. MOM is the 11 month buy-and-hold 
return from the July of year t – 1 to May of year t. Growth is the change in total assets scaled by lagged assets. ROA is 
operating income before depreciation scaled by lagged book assets. R&D is research and development spending scaled 
by lagged assets. We set missing R&D values to zero. BHAR is the 12 month buy-and-hold stock return from July of 
year t to June of year t + 1. LTG is the mean analysts’ forecast of long term EPS growth rate available in June of year t. 
Except for BHAR, all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the whole 
sample, Panel B for firm-year observations with positive net external financing and Panel C for firm-year observations 
with negative external financing. 
 
Panel A: Whole sample 
          
  N Median Mean Std 
NF 93,922 0.0178 0.0686 0.2018 
ER 93,922 0.0361 0.3314 1.0692 
MV 93,922 83,145 971,084 3,103,698 
BM 93,922 0.5993 0.8166 0.7990 
MOM 93,922 0.0325 0.1198 0.5624 
Growth 93,922 0.0900 0.1850 0.4342 
ROA 93,803 0.1384 0.1143 0.2059 
R&D 93,922 0.0000 0.0401 0.0877 
BHAR 93,922 0.0520 0.1512 0.7256 
LTG 39,766 15.00% 17.13% 8.98% 
 
Panel B: Capital raising firms vs capital distributing firms 
  
  
NF < 0 
     
  
 NF < 0 
  
  N Median Mean Std   N Median Mean Std 
NF 53,948 0.0777 0.1622 0.2186  39,974 -0.0368 -0.0578 0.0583 
ER 53,948 0.0978 0.4329 1.0312  39,974 0.0000 0.1945 1.1037 
MV 53,948 90,312 799,380 2,603,191  39,974 72,083 1,202,812 3,659,860 
BM 53,948 0.5401 0.7348 0.7376  39,974 0.6871 0.9269 0.8629 
MOM 53,948 0.0024 0.0911 0.5725  39,974 0.0671 0.1585 0.5461 
Growth 53,948 0.1715 0.3048 0.5055  39,974 0.0160 0.0234 0.2293 
ROA 53,875 0.1379 0.0947 0.2450  39,928 0.1390 0.1406 0.1319 
R&D 53,948 0.0000 0.0513 0.1050  39,974 0.0000 0.0249 0.0530 
BHAR 53,948 0.0196 0.1175 0.7346  39,974 0.0911 0.1966 0.7107 
LTG 23,019 17.00% 18.73% 9.89%  16,747 13.97% 14.94% 6.99% 
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development spending scaled by lagged assets.
8
 BHAR is the 12 month buy-and-hold stock return 
from July of year t to June of year t + 1. LTG is the mean analysts’ forecast of long term EPS 
growth rate available in June of year t. This variable is available for only 39,766 firm-year 
observations. For one thing, I/B/E/S does not provide analysts’ forecasts of long term EPS growth 
rate before 1981. For another, even after 1981, analysts do not provide long term forecasts for all 
sample firms. Except for BHAR, all variables in Table 1.1 are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
In Panels B and C of Table 1.1, we report the descriptive statistics separately for firms 
raising capital (NF>0) and for those distributing capital (NF<0). Consistent with the statistics 
reported by BCGW (2010), firms raising capital are smaller, have lower book-to-market ratios 
and more aggressive asset growth. More importantly, the distribution of the NF variable is 
different between the two subsamples. For firms raising capital, the NF variable has a mean of 
0.1622 and a standard deviation of 0.2186. For firms distributing capital, the NF variable has a 
mean of -0.0578 and a standard deviation of 0.0583. Therefore, there is more cross-sectional 
variation in NF among firms raising capital than among firms distributing capital. This is one of 
the reasons why BCGW (2010) suggest that the net financing effect may be non-linear in that 
there may be a larger difference in future stock return for firms raising capital than for firms 
distributing capital.  
 
3. Equity ratio and earnings announcement returns 
 
3.1. Results from portfolio sorts 
In this section, we examine whether the debt-equity composition of net external financing 
are related to the earnings announcement returns in the subsequent year. At the end of June of 
                                                          
8
 Following the common practice in previous research, we set missing R&D spending to zero. Huang and Ritter (2009) 
find that the vast majority of firms with missing R&D are firms in industries such as clothing retailers for which R&D 
expenditures are likely to be zero. In our regression analysis, we perform robustness checks to ensure that our results 
are not driven by the assumption that firms with missing R&D values spend negligible amount on research and 
development. 
. 
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each year t, we sort firms into quartiles by net external financing (NF). Then we divide each NF 
quartile into four portfolios based on the values of the firms’ equity ratios.9 We examine whether 
the 3-day event returns for the earnings announcements that occur between July of year t and June 
of year t + 1 differ across the NF × ER portfolios. 
For each calendar quarter between July 1972 and June 2010, we calculate equal weighted 
earnings announcement returns, raw and benchmark-adjusted, for the NF×ER portfolios. We 
annualize these portfolio level EARs (multiplying by 4) and present the time series means for 
each portfolio in Table 1.2. In addition, we form low-minus-high hedge portfolios by longing 
firms in the lowest NF (ER) groups and shorting those in the highest NF (ER) groups. The time 
series means of the EARs on these hedge portfolios are also presented in Table 1.2. The statistical 
significance is calculated based on the time series standard errors of the hedge portfolio returns. 
We examine firms raising capital and those distributing capital separately. Panel A 
presents the results calculated using raw EARs for firms raising capital (NF > 0). Consistent with 
Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006), the raw announcement period returns decrease from the 
lowest NF quartiles to the highest NF quartiles. More importantly, for each of the net financing 
quartiles, the raw EARs decrease from the lowest equity ratio quartile to the highest equity ratio 
quartile with reasonable degree of monotonicity. The returns on all low-minus-high hedge 
portfolios are positive and significant at 1% significance level. For example, within the highest 
NF quartile, firms with the lowest equity ratios earn 2.54% more than those with the highest 
equity ratios over the four earnings announcements. The evidence in Panel A suggests that both 
the level of external financing and the debt-equity composition of external financing are related to 
future earnings announcement returns. Holding the level of external financing constant, firms 
issuing more equity relative to debt tend to have lower earnings announcement returns than those   
                                                          
9 If firms’ equity ratios are clustered at certain values, such as 0, for a particular NF quartile in a particular year, the 
number of stocks in each ER portfolio need not be even for that particular NF quartile in that particular year. We sort 
firms into ER portfolios using the SAS proc rank procedure. 
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Table 1.2. Earning announcement Returns by NF and ER quartiles 
 
This table reports the annualized earnings announcement returns (%) by net external financing (NF) and equity ratio (ER) quartiles. At the end of June of each year t, we sort firms 
into quartiles by NF. Then we divide each NF portfolio into quartiles by ER. The NF-ER portfolios are then matched with the earnings announcements that occur between July of 
year t and June of year t + 1. For each calendar quarter, we calculate the average earnings announcement return (EAR) for each NF-ER portfolio. The annualized (multiplying by 4) 
returns presented in the table are averages over all formation periods. For each quarter, we also form hedge portfolios by longing stocks in the lowest NF (ER) quartiles and 
shorting stocks in the highest NF (ER) quartiles. The time series standard errors of the hedge portfolio returns are used to calculate the t-statistics in the parentheses. Panel A 
presents the raw EARs for capital raising firms (NF >0). The raw EARs are defined as the 3-day buy-and-hold returns surrounding the earnings announcements. Panel B presents 
the benchmark-adjusted EARs for capital raising firms (NF > 0). The benchmark-adjusted EARs are defined as raw EARs minus the average EARs of firms with similar size, 
book-to-market ratio and momentum that announce earnings during the same calendar quarter. Panel C presents the raw EARs for capital distributing firms (NF < 0). Panel D 
presents the benchmark-adjusted EARs for capital distributing firms (NF < 0).  
 
Panel A: Raw EARs (%), NF > 0 
 
Panel B: Benchmark-adjusted EARs (%), NF > 0 
                   
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
  
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
 
 
Low 2.36 1.97 1.81 1.06 
 
1.30 (2.20) 
  
Low 0.54 0.27 -0.03 -0.44 
 
0.99 (1.83) 
Equity 2 2.09 2.36 1.42 0.43 
 
1.66 (2.88) 
 
Equity 2 0.47 0.51 -0.22 -0.62 
 
1.10 (2.05) 
Ratio 3 1.04 1.10 0.89 -1.76 
 
2.79 (4.83) 
 
Ratio 3 -0.04 -0.02 -0.28 -2.30 
 
2.26 (4.14) 
 
High 0.55 0.37 -0.28 -1.48 
 
2.02 (3.46) 
  
High -0.49 -0.62 -1.17 -1.93 
 
1.44 (2.54) 
                   
 
L-H 1.81 1.60 2.09 2.54 
      
1.03 0.88 1.14 1.48 
       (4.15) (3.71) (3.54) (3.47)       
 
    (2.53) (2.22) (2.06) (2.12)       
                   Panel C: Raw EARs (%), NF < 0 
 
Panel D: Benchmark-adjusted EARs (%), NF < 0 
                   
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
  
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
 
 
Low 2.07 2.17 2.12 1.05 
 
1.03 (1.68) 
  
Low 0.91 0.41 0.56 -0.17 
 
1.08 (1.82) 
Equity 2 3.88 2.67 2.87 1.79 
 
2.10 (3.30) 
 
Equity 2 1.90 0.56 0.59 0.12 
 
1.78 (2.94) 
Ratio 3 3.05 2.62 2.74 2.62 
 
0.43 (0.68) 
 
Ratio 3 1.22 0.66 0.56 0.55 
 
0.67 (1.05) 
 
High 2.40 1.89 2.56 2.13 
 
0.27 (0.52) 
  
High 0.85 0.09 0.68 0.29 
 
0.57 (1.11) 
                   
 
L-H -0.32 0.29 -0.44 -1.08 
     
L-H 0.06 0.32 -0.13 -0.46 
       (-0.54) (0.61) (-0.93) (-2.30)       
 
    (0.10) (0.69) (-0.27) (-0.99)       
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issuing more debt relative to equity. This is more consistent with the mispricing hypothesis than 
with the investment based explanations.  
The annualized raw EARs on the four ER hedge portfolios range from 1.60% to 2.54%. 
To assess the economic significance of the results in Panel A, we compare these hedge portfolio 
returns with the results from other anomaly studies. La Porta, Lakonoishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) find that firms in the bottom book-to-market ratio quintile earn 3.22% more than those in 
the top book-to-market ratio quintile over the subsequent four earnings announcements
10
. The 
results reported by Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) suggest a zero-cost portfolio formed by longing 
firms in the lowest capital investment quintile and shorting those in the highest capital investment 
quintile generates 1.19% in market adjusted return.  Thus, the debt-equity composition effect 
appears to have comparable economic significance to previously documented anomalies. In the 
analysis that follows, we will also examine the economic significance of the debt-equity 
composition effect on risk-adjusted basis. After adjusting for risk factors, we find the relative 
economic significance of the debt-equity composition effect to be even higher. 
In Panel B, we present the benchmark-adjusted results for firms raising capital (NF > 0). 
The benchmark-adjusted EARs are defined as raw EARs minus the average EARs of firms with 
similar size, book-to-market ratio and momentum that announce earnings in the same calendar 
quarter. To the extent that the proceeds from financing activities are used to finance investment or 
asset growth, our bivariate sort also includes a partial control for the asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, 
and Schill (2008)) or investment (Titman, Wei and Xie (2004)) effects. There has been debate 
about whether the book-to-market, momentum and investment (asset growth) effects reflect 
market mispricing or compensation for risks. If we view these effects as market anomalies, it is 
unnecessary to control for these factors for testing the debt-equity substitution hypothesis. If firms 
                                                          
10 La Porta, Lakonoishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) report that the equal weighted portfolio returns for the bottom 
two book-to-market deciles are -0.472% and 0.772%  and  for the top two book-to-market ratio deciles 3.2% and 
3.532%. We calculate the returns on the hedge portfolio formed by shorting and longing the quintile portfolios as [(3.2% 
+3.532%)/2-(-0.472% + 0.772% )/2]. 
19 
 
with low book-to-market ratio and high asset growth are systematically overpriced, it is natural 
for equity market timers to issue more equities relative to debt at times when their firms have 
lower book-to-market ratio and higher asset growth. However, if we view the stock return effects 
associated with size, book-to-market ratio, momentum and investment (asset growth) as 
compensation for risks, we need to control for these risk factors to make sure that the debt-equity 
composition effect we identify is not driven by known risk factors. 
The results in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A. Holding the NF quartiles 
constant, the benchmark-adjusted EARs generally increase as we move from low to high ER 
quartiles. The four ER low-minus-high hedge portfolios generate benchmark-adjusted EARs 
ranging from 0.88% to 1.48%, all statistically significant at 95% confidence level. Therefore, 
after controlling for other known anomalies and/or risk factors related to size, book-to-market 
ratio, momentum and investment (asset growth) and ROA, firms issuing more equity relative to 
debt still earn higher returns at subsequent earnings announcements than those issuing more debt 
relative to equity. These benchmark-adjusted hedge portfolio EARs cannot be directly compared 
with the results in La Porta, Lakonoishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) or those in Titman, Wei 
and Xie (2004) because earlier studies adjust EARs only for market returns or size returns. We 
will discuss the economic significance of these benchmark-adjusted EARs in our regression 
analysis. 
Panels C and D present the earnings announcement test results for firms distributing 
capital (NF < 0). There appear to be no clear relation between NF, ER and EARs. Most of the 
hedge portfolios formed by longing and shorting the extreme NF (ER) portfolios are statistically 
insignificant. Following the logic in BCGW (2010), one possible explanation is that the cross-
sectional variation in net financing is relatively small among firms distributing cash. Therefore, 
the information in this subsample is noisier than the information in the capital raising subsample. 
It should be emphasized that the results in Panels C and D only show that there is not enough 
“within” variation in EARs among the capital distributing firms. They do not necessarily mean 
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that NF or ER has no effect on the earnings announcement returns of these firms. For example, 
even though the results in Panel D shows no clear relation between NF and benchmark-adjusted 
EARs, a comparison across Panel B and Panel D shows that capital distributing firms (NF<0) are 
much more likely to have positive benchmark-adjusted EARs than capital raising firms (NF>0).  
Overall, our earnings announcement test results suggest that firms issuing more equity 
relative to debt earn higher raw and benchmark-adjusted EARs than those issuing more debt 
relative to equity. From the mispricing perspective, this can occur because firms tend to issue 
more equities when they are more overvalued. Investors are more negatively surprised when 
negative information about the overvalued firms is revealed at subsequent earnings 
announcements. Yet, the investment based theories provides no clear reason why equity issuers 
should earn lower earnings announcement returns than debt issuers.  
 
3.2. Results from cross-sectional regressions 
In this section, we examine the relation between net external financing, equity ratio and 
subsequent earnings announcement returns using regression analysis. The regression analysis 
allows us to control for additional factors that are known to affect stock returns. Besides, it 
provides an easy way to compare the economic magnitude across anomalies. We run cross-
sectional regressions of earnings announcement returns on equity ratio, level of net external 
financing and various control variables. The regression model, is specified in equation (3). 
                           
                    
                    
                                 
                                                  
In equation (3), the dependent variable is the 3-day buy-and-hold returns over the earnings 
announcement windows.          is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when a firm 
has negative external financing for year t and 0 otherwise.          is an indicator variable for 
firms with positive external financing. ER
dec
 is the transformed decile ranking of equity ratio. 
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Following Mashruwalaa, Rajgopala, and Shevli, we rank firms into deciles by equity ratio and 
then transform the decile ranks into a value between -0.5 and 0.5. When the variable is so 
transformed, its coefficient can be interpreted as the EARs earned on a hedge portfolio formed by 
shorting firms in the lowest equity ratio decile and longing those in the highest equity ratio decile. 
Following BCGW (2010), we use the interaction terms to allow the signs and magnitudes of 
coefficients of the ER and NF variables to differ between firms raising capital and those 
distributing capital. Both the descriptive statistics for the two variables and the results from 
portfolio sorts suggest that it is important to allow the coefficients to vary between the two 
subsamples. We estimate the model using the Fama MecBeth (1973) procedure, which involves 
running cross-sectional regressions each calendar quarter and then averaging the coefficients 
across quarters. We adjust for the autocorrelation in the quarterly coefficients using the 
adjustment factor proposed by Abarbanell and Bernard (2000)
11
.  
Table 1.3 summarizes the regression results for the model in equation (3). Model (1) is 
similar to the portfolio sort analysis in Panel A of Table 1.2 in that it includes only the interaction 
terms related to NF and ER
dec
. Consistent the results from portfolio sorts, the coefficients for 
POSNF × NF and POSNF × ER
dec
 are significantly negative. The coefficient for POSNF × ER
dec
 
is -0.6458, which indicates that the hedge portfolio strategy of longing capital raising firms in the 
lowest ER decile and shorting those in the highest ER decile generates about 2.58% in EARs 
(0.6458 × 4) over the four subsequent earnings announcements. This is of slightly larger 
economic magnitude than those reported in Panel A of Table 1.2 because the hedge portfolios in 
Table 1.3 are formed by longing and shorting more extreme ER portfolios (longing and shorting 
extreme deciles vs longing and shorting extreme quartiles). 
                                                          
11
 We adjust for the autocorrelation in the quarterly coefficient by multiplying the unadjusted standard error 
to an adjustment factor √
   
   
 
        
       
, where n is the number of quarterly coefficients and Ø the first 
order autoregressive coefficient estimated from the respective quarterly coefficients. 
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Model (2) includes log(MV),  log(BM) and MOM as control variables for the size, book-to- 
market and momentum effects. The coefficients for these control variables have expected signs 
and are statically significant. The regression results suggest that earnings announcement returns 
tend to be higher for smaller firms, high book-to-market firms and firms with higher stock return 
momentums. More importantly, the coefficients for POSNF × NF and POSNF × ER
dec
 are both 
negative and statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Therefore, after 
controlling for the size, book-to-market and momentum effects, the regression results are still 
consistent with the mispricing hypothesis. 
Model (3) includes asset growth and ROA as two additional control variables. Motivated 
by the q-theory of investment, Chen and Zhang (2010) propose an alternative three factor model. 
They find that the investment and ROA factors can explain a significant portion of the cross-
sectional variation in stock returns and several well known anomalies. Since the investment based 
explanations for financing anomalies are related to the q-theory of investment, it makes sense to 
check whether the debt-equity composition effect is robust to the inclusion of investment (asset 
growth) and ROA as control variables. Consistent with the predictions by Chen and Zhang (2010), 
the coefficient for asset growth, which we use as a comprehensive measure for firms’ investment 
activities, is negative and significant. The coefficient for ROA has the correct sign but is 
statistically insignificant. Chen and Zhang (2010) suggest that the ROA effect is related to the 
momentum effect. This could explain why the coefficient for ROA is insignificant when the 
model includes MOM as a control variable. After controlling for asset growth, the coefficient for 
POSNF × NF decreases in magnitude from -1.0759 in Model (2) to – 0.2569, which is 
statistically indistinguishable from 0. This suggests there might be a relation between the net 
external financing effect and the firms’ investment activities. However, the coefficient for 
POSNF × ER
dec
 changes little from Model (2). It remains significant with a t value of -5.47. The 
results for Model (3) show that the debt-equity composition effect still exists after controlling for 
firms’ investment activities. Therefore, the investment based theories cannot explain why equity 
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Table 1.3. Regression of earning announcement returns on external financing variables 
 
This table reports the regression of earnings announcement returns (EARs) on net external financing (NF) and equity ratio (ER). We calculate the independent variables at the end 
of June of each year t and match them with the earnings announcements that occur between July of year t and June of year t + 1. EARs are calculated as the 3-day buy-and-hold 
returns surrounding the earnings announcements. NF is net external financing, defined as the net amount of cash from issuing and repurchasing debt and equity securities scaled by 
average assets. ERdec is the decile ranking for equity ratio, defined as the proportion of net equity to net cash raised. The decile ranking is transformed to a value between -0.5 to 
0.5. POSNF is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms with positive net external financing. NEGNF is an indicator variable that takes the value of one firms with 
negative net external financing. Log(MV) is the logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of June of year t. Log(B/M) is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, defined 
as the book value of equity as of the fiscal year end that occur in calendar year t – 1 scaled by the market value of equity at the end of December of year t - 1. Growth is the change 
in assets scaled by lagged assets. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by lagged book assets. The models are estimated using the Fama MecBeth procedure. The 
standard errors are calculated with the time series of quarterly coefficients, with the autocorrelation in the quarterly coefficients adjusted using the method in Abarranel and 
Bernard (2000). The t statistics are reported in the parentheses. The adjusted R2 statistics are the mean adjusted R2 for the 152 quarterly regressions. 
 
                            
  Intercept 
POSNF  
× NF 
NEGNF  
× NF 
POSNF  
× ER
dec
 
NEGNF  
× ER
dec
 POSNF Log(MV) Log(BM) MOM Growth ROA R&D 
Adjusted 
R
2
 (%) 
(1) 0.0058 -0.0104 -0.0117 -0.0065 0.0006 -0.0017 
      
0.24 
 
(6.80) (-5.86) (-2.58) (-9.01) (0.75) (-4.18) 
       
              (2) 0.0161 -0.0108 -0.0079 -0.0046 0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0021 0.0011 
   
0.62 
 
(9.13) (-5.64) (-1.68) (-6.48) (1.44) (-1.94) (-6.84) (6.58) (1.93) 
    
              (3) 0.0175 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0039 0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0017 0.0011 -0.0036 0.0017 
 
0.70 
 
(9.89) (-1.14) (-0.54) (-5.42) (1.30) (-2.47) (-7.81) (5.21) (1.90) (-5.16) (0.97) 
  
              (4) 0.0175 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0040 0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0017 0.0011 -0.0036 0.0019 0.0023 0.75 
  (10.00) (-1.09) (-0.58) (-5.54) (1.27) (-2.51) (-7.89) (5.29) (1.93) (-5.05) (1.06) (0.47)   
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issuers earn lower earnings announcement returns than debt issuers. In Model (4), we add R&D 
as an additional control variable to Model (3). There appears to be no evidence that R&D is 
related to subsequent earnings announcement returns. We will go back to the R&D issue in that 
analysis that follows. 
To assess the economic significance of the debt-equity composition effect, we re-estimate 
Model (3) after transforming the Log(BM) variable to its decile ranking BM
dec
. The coefficient 
for BM
dec
 is 0.3749, which indicates that the hedge strategy based on longing and shorting 
extreme book-to-market deciles generates about 1.50% (0.3749 × 4) in abnormal return over the 
subsequent four earnings announcements. In comparison, the coefficient for POSNF × ER
dec
 is -
0.4035, which is equivalent to 1.64% in abnormal return over the four earnings announcements. 
We also re-estimate Model (3) after transforming Log(MV), Log(BM), MOM, Growth and ROA 
all into their decile rankings. We find the economic magnitude of the debt-equity composition 
effect is similar to the magnitude of the book-to-market effect and large than those of the MOM 
and ROA effects.  
Overall, the earnings announcement test results suggest that firms issuing more equity 
relative to debt earn lower returns at subsequent earnings announcements than those issuing more 
debt than equity. This debt-equity composition effect is statistically and economically significant. 
It still exists after controlling for the size, book-to-market, momentum, investment (asset growth) 
and ROA effects. This suggests that investors are more negatively surprised by equity issuers 
than by debt issuers. From the mispricing perspective, such debt-equity composition effect can 
occur when managers at more overvalued firms issue more equity relative to debt to exploit the 
market mispricing. Our findings are thus consistent with the view that market mispricing plays an 
important role in driving the financing anomalies. 
 
4. Debt-equity choice, growth options and future stock returns 
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The results in Section 3 suggest that heavy equity issuers earn lower earnings 
announcement returns than heavy debt issuers. Our findings are thus consistent with the market 
timing hypothesis, but inconsistent with the evidence provided by BCGW (2010). We 
hypothesize that BCGW (2010) find no evidence of market timing because of the confounding 
effect associated with the equity financing of growth options. In this section, we provide evidence 
in support of this hypothesis. We use firms’ R&D expenditure, defined as R&D spending scaled 
by lagged assets, as the proxy for firms’ propensity to invest in growth options. R&D expenditure 
is one of the most intuitive proxies for the investment in growth options because firms with high 
R&D expenditures are more likely to invest in growth options. However, it is unlikely that R&D 
expenditure can fully capture firms’ investments in growth options because not all growth options 
are R&D related. In this sense, the evidence presented in this section only provides a very 
conservative estimate of debt-equity composition effect in year-ahead stock returns. Our goal is 
not to provide a precise point estimate of the market timing effect associated with firms’ debt-
equity choices, but to verify whether different conclusions about the mispricing hypothesis can be 
reached before and after controlling for the new investment-in-growth-options effect. 
 
4.1 Results from portfolio sorts 
We follow the same portfolio sort procedure as in Section 3. At the end of June of each 
year t, we sort firms into quartiles by the level of net external financing (NF). Then we divide 
each NF quartile into four portfolios by equity ratio (ER). The sorts are done separately for 
capital raising firms (NF > 0) and capital distributing firms (NF < 0). We examine how the raw 
and benchmark-adjusted year-ahead stock returns vary across the NF × ER portfolios. The raw 
year-ahead stock returns are measured as the 12 month buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) from July 
of year t to June of year t + 1. The benchmark-adjusted BHARs are defined as raw BHARs minus 
the average BHARs of firms with similar size, book-to-market ratio and stock return momentum. 
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Table 1.4. 12 month buy-and-hold returns by ER and NF quartiles 
 
This table reports the 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) by net external financing (NF) and equity ratio (ER) quartiles.  At the end of June of each year t, we sort firms into 
quartiles by NF. Then we divide each NF portfolio into quartiles by ER. For each year, we calculate the equally weighted buy-and-hold return (BHAR) for each NF-ER portfolio. 
The returns presented in the table are averages over all formation periods. For each year, we also form hedge portfolios by longing stocks in the lowest NF (ER) quartiles and 
shorting stocks in the highest NF (ER) quartiles. The time series standard errors of the hedge portfolio returns are used to calculate the t-statistics in the parentheses. Panel A 
presents the raw BHARs for capital raising firms (NF >0). The raw BHARs are defined as the 12 month buy-and-hold returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Panel B 
presents the benchmark-adjusted BHARs for capital raising firms (NF > 0). The benchmark-adjusted BHARs are defined as raw BHARs minus the average BHARs of firms with 
similar size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. Panel C presents the raw BHARs for capital distributing firms (NF < 0). Panel D presents the benchmark-adjusted BHARs for 
capital distributing firms (NF < 0). 
 
Panel A: Raw BHARs, NF > 0 
 
Panel B: Benchmark-adjusted BHARs, NF > 0 
                   
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
  
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
 
 
Low 19.27 16.70 15.45 7.70 
 
11.57 (6.08) 
  
Low 2.62 0.91 0.14 -5.72 
 
8.34 (5.21) 
Equity 2 15.21 15.36 11.81 2.32 
 
12.89 (5.17) 
 
Equity 2 -0.61 -0.61 -2.58 -9.86 
 
9.25 (5.14) 
Ratio 3 16.50 13.64 9.28 3.35 
 
13.14 (5.33) 
 
Ratio 3 3.83 -0.04 -3.09 -6.88 
 
10.71 (5.22) 
 
High 12.71 11.38 7.86 2.50 
 
10.22 (4.05) 
  
High 0.12 -0.42 -3.42 -7.32 
 
7.44 (3.62) 
                   
 
L-H 6.56 5.31 7.59 5.21 
      
2.50 1.32 3.55 1.60 
       (3.09) (1.68) (2.61) (1.58)       
 
    (1.74) (0.64) (1.68) (0.65)       
                   Panel C: Raw BHARs, NF < 0 
 
Panel D: Benchmark-adjusted BHARs, NF < 0 
                   
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
  
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
 
 
Low 16.86 19.30 17.82 17.37 
 
-0.51 (-0.22) 
  
Low 2.82 4.42 2.49 3.69 
 
-0.87 (-0.39) 
Equity 2 19.88 20.09 17.86 17.53 
 
2.34 (0.83) 
 
Equity 2 3.33 3.04 0.58 1.75 
 
1.58 (0.65) 
Ratio 3 21.22 20.47 18.91 19.69 
 
1.53 (0.70) 
 
Ratio 3 4.98 2.98 1.80 2.43 
 
2.55 (1.22) 
 
High 21.56 21.23 17.79 17.86 
 
3.70 (1.92) 
  
High 6.14 5.26 1.39 1.42 
 
4.71 (2.85) 
                   
 
L-H -4.70 -1.93 0.02 -0.49 
     
L-H -3.32 -0.84 1.10 2.26 
   
    (-1.75) (-0.97) (0.01) 
(-
0.23)       
 
    
(-
1.41) 
(-
0.46) (0.71) (1.16)       
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Each year, we calculate the equal weighted raw and adjusted BHARs for each of the NF 
× ER portfolios. By so doing, we obtain 38 years of equal weighted portfolio BHARs for each of 
the NF×ER portfolios from July 1972 to June 2010. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the time series 
means of these portfolio returns. The significance levels of the low-minus-high hedge portfolios 
are based on time series standard errors. If the mispricing hypothesis holds, firms issuing 
(repurchasing) more equity relative to debt will earn lower (higher) year-ahead stock returns than 
those issuing (repurchasing) more debt relative to equity.  
In Table 1.4, we present the results without controlling for the investment in new growth 
options. We keep the discussion about Table 1.4 concise because our goal is only to show that, 
without controlling for R&D, our results are consistent with the findings by BCGW (2010). 
BCGW (2010) reports only benchmark-adjusted results. For completeness, we report both the raw 
and benchmark-adjusted BHARs for the NF × ER portfolios. Panel A of Table 1.4 presents the 
raw BHARs for the capital raising firms (NF > 0). Holding the NF quartiles constant, the raw 
BHARs appear to decrease as we move from the low to high ER portfolios. However, only two of 
the ER hedge portfolios generate returns that statistically different from 0 at the 5% significance 
level. The other two have significance level below 10%. Panel B presents the benchmark-adjusted 
BHARs for capital raising firms (NF > 0). Since the returns in Panel B are benchmark-adjusted, 
they are more comparable to the portfolio sort results reported by BCGW (2010).  So are the 
results. We find the portfolio BHARs decrease monotonically with the level of net external 
financing. However, holding the NF quartiles constant, there is no clear relation between the 
equity ratio and future stock returns. In Panels C and D, we present the results for the capital 
distributing firms. There appear to be no consistent relation between future stock return and either 
the level or the composition of net external financing. Overall, the results in Table 1.4 are 
consistent with those reported by BCGW (2010). Without controlling for the investment in 
growth options, we find no evidence of equity market timing. 
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Table 1.5. 12 month buy-and-hold returns by ER and NF quartiles, after excluding high R&D firms 
 
This table reports the 12-month buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) by net external financing (NF) and equity ratio (ER) quartiles.  At the end of June of each year t, we sort firms into 
quartiles by NF. Then we divide each NF portfolio into quartiles by ER. For each year, we calculate the equally weighted buy-and-hold return (BHAR) for each NF-ER portfolio. 
The returns presented in the table are averages over all formation periods. For each year, we also form hedge portfolios by longing stocks in the lowest NF (ER) quartiles and 
shorting stocks in the highest NF (ER) quartiles. The time series standard errors of the hedge portfolio returns are used to calculate the t-statistics in the parentheses. Panel A 
presents the raw BHARs for capital raising firms (NF >0). The raw BHARs are defined as the 12 month buy-and-hold returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Panel B 
presents the benchmark-adjusted BHARs for capital raising firms (NF > 0). The benchmark-adjusted BHARs are defined as raw BHARs minus the average BHARs of firms with 
similar size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. Panel C presents the raw BHARs for capital distributing firms (NF < 0). Panel D presents the benchmark-adjusted BHARs for 
capital distributing firms (NF < 0) . 
 
Panel A: Raw BHAR, NF > 0 
 
 Panel B: Benchmark-adjusted BHAR, NF > 0 
                  
 
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
 
  
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H  
 
Low 19.14 16.08 14.23 8.57 
 
10.56 (5.27) 
  
Low 2.26 0.23 -1.29 -5.26 
 
7.52 (4.41) 
Equity 2 13.75 14.96 11.44 2.40 
 
11.35 (4.47) 
 
Equity 2 -2.01 -0.96 -3.09 -10.64 
 
8.63 (4.15) 
Ratio 3 15.22 11.72 8.25 0.13 
 
15.09 (4.95) 
 
Ratio 3 1.92 -2.26 -4.42 -10.80 
 
12.72 (4.78) 
 
High 10.65 8.15 5.55 -1.59 
 
12.24 (4.14) 
  
High -2.75 -3.97 -6.14 -11.67 
 
8.93 (3.27) 
                  
 
 
L-H 8.48 7.93 8.68 10.16 
      
5.01 4.20 4.84 6.41 
  
 
    (5.18) (2.59) (3.73) (3.29)       
 
    (3.35) (1.77) (2.75) (2.29)      
                  
 
Panel C: Raw BHAR, NF < 0 
 
Panel D: Benchmark-adjusted BHAR, NF < 0 
                 
 
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
  
 
  
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
How 2 3 High 
 
L-H  
 
Low 15.95 17.36 16.05 16.25 
 
-0.30 (-0.13) 
  
Low 1.58 2.14 0.50 2.19 
 
-0.61 (-0.28) 
Equity 2 19.58 19.74 17.00 15.26 
 
4.32 (1.70) 
 
Equity 2 2.81 2.54 -0.28 -0.63 
 
3.44 (1.70) 
Ratio 3 20.49 20.17 18.98 18.96 
 
1.53 (0.64) 
 
Ratio 3 4.13 2.33 1.77 1.31 
 
2.81 (1.22) 
 
High 20.11 20.39 16.70 17.33 
 
2.79 (1.41) 
  
High 4.32 4.29 -0.02 0.57 
 
3.74 (2.11) 
                  
 
 
L-H -4.16 -3.02 -0.64 -1.08 
     
L-H -2.74 -2.15 0.53 1.62 
  
 
    (-1.33) (-1.39) (-0.39) (-0.48)       
 
    (-1.03) (-1.09) (0.36) (0.77)      
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Our approach to mitigating the investment-in-growth-options effect is straightforward: 
we compare the NF × ER portfolio BHARs after excluding firms with R&D expenditure higher 
than 5% of lagged assets.  Since high R&D firms are more likely to invest in growth options, the 
confounding investment-in-growth-options effect is likely to be the strongest among these firms. 
If our hypotheses regarding the market timing effect and the investment-in-growth-options effect 
hold, we should detect stronger evidence for market timing after excluding firms that are most 
seriously affected by the confounding effect.
12
  Table 1.5 presents the portfolio sort results after 
excluding the high R&D firms. In Panel A, we present the raw BHARs for firms raising capital 
(NF > 0). Holding the NF quartiles constant, the raw BHARs decrease with equity ratio with 
reasonable monotonicity. The BHAR spreads between low and high ER portfolios are larger than 
those reported in Panel A of Table 1.4. The returns on all ER portfolios are positive and 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels.  
As we argue in Section 3, if we view the size, book-to-market and momentum effects as 
anomalies, we do not have to control for these factors in testing the market timing hypotheses. If 
so, the raw BHAR results in Panel A can be interpreted as solid evidence for the market timing 
hypothesis. However, if we view the stock return effects associated with size, book-to-market 
ratio, momentum as compensation for risks, we need to check whether the debt-equity 
composition effect still holds after controlling for these risk factors. In Panel B of Table 1.5, we 
present the benchmark-adjusted BHARs for firms raising capital (NF > 0). We first examine how 
the benchmark-adjusted BHARs change across the portfolios. Except for in the lowest NF 
quartile, the benchmark-adjusted BHARs decrease monotonically as we move from the lowest to 
the highest ER portfolio. 
13
 The results are less monotonic for firms in the lowest NF quartile, 
                                                          
12 In Table 1.5., we do not re-sort the portfolios after excluding the high R&D firms. We examine the results after re-
sorting as robustness check. We find re-sorting strengthens our results. 
13 Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) sort firms into deciles by net external financing. Their results are not 
perfectly monotonic, either. For example, they find the size-adjusted BHARs for the lowest NF portfolio, the third 
lowest NF portfolio and the fifth lowest portfolio are, respectively, 0.041, 0.020 and 0.043. Considering that we 
perform the more challenging task of bivariate sort, the degree of monotonicity displayed in Panel B is already very 
impressive.  
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perhaps because they raise smaller amount of cash through external financing.
14
 The mean NF for 
these firms is 0.018, as opposed to 0.39 for those in the highest NF quartile. When firms raise 
only a small amount of cash, managers are less concerned about whether they are overvalued. 
Consequently, the equity ratio is a noisier proxy for managers’ market timing incentives for these 
firms. Then we examine the returns on the ER hedge portfolios. The four low-minus-high 
portfolios generate benchmark-adjusted BHARs ranging from 4.2% - 6.41% per annum. For the 
ER hedge portfolio in the second lowest NF quartile, the hedge returns are statistically different 
from 0 at 10% significance level. The hedge returns on the other three portfolios are significant at 
1% significance level. Therefore, after excluding firms that are most seriously affected by the 
investment-in-growth-options effect, we find heavy equity issuers have lower year-ahead stock 
returns than heavy debt issuers.  
We present the results for capital distributing firms (NF < 0) in Panel C and Panel D. For 
capital distributing firms, there appear to be no consistent relation between ER, NF and futures 
stock return. Following the argument by BCGW (2010), the results in Panel C and D are “not 
surprising because the cross-sectional variation in net financing among firms distributing capital 
is relatively small”. They only show that there is not enough “within” variation in BHARs among 
the capital distributing firms. They do not necessarily mean that NF or ER has no effect on the 
stock returns of these firms. For example, even though the returns on the NF hedge portfolios in 
Panel D are statistically insignificant, a comparison between Panel B and Panel D shows that, on 
average, capital distributing firms (NF < 0)  have higher returns than capital raising firms (NF > 
0). 
Overall, the evidence in Table 1.5 supports our hypotheses regarding the market timing 
effect and the investment-in-growth-options effect. Without controlling for the investment in 
                                                          
14 Interestingly, some of the firms in the lowest ER portfolio in the lowest NF quartile have low NF because the equity 
they issue offsets the debt they issue. These firms have larger net equity (debt) issue size than firms in the middle two 
ER portfolios. This can explain why the BHAR difference between the lowest and the highest ER portfolios is 
significant in the lowest NF quartile. 
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growth options, our results are consistent with the findings by BCGW (2010). However, after 
excluding firms that are most likely to be affected by the confounding effect related to the 
investment in growth options, we find firms issuing more equity relative to debt tend to have 
lower future stock returns even after controlling for the level of net external financing. 
 
4.2 Results from cross-sectional regressions 
In this section, we examine the relation between equity ratio and future stock returns 
using cross-sectional regressions. We regress raw BHAR on NF, ER
dec
 and various control 
variables. The regressions are estimated using the Fama MacBeth (1973) procedure. We adjust 
for the autocorrelation in the annual coefficients using the method proposed by Abarranel and 
Bernard (2000). 
The regression results are presented in Table 1.6.  The two benchmark models, Model (1) 
and Model (2), do not include R&D as a control variable. Model (1) includes control variables for 
the size, book-to-market and momentum effects. Consistent with the findings by BCGW (2010), 
the coefficients for POSNF × ER
dec
 and NEGNF × ER
dec
 are statistically insignificant in the 
presence of POSNF × NF and NEGNF × NF. Model (2) includes asset growth and ROA as 
additional control variables. The coefficients for POSNF × ER
dec
 and NEGNF × ER
dec
 remain 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient for POSNF × NF decreases 
to statistically insignificant level, suggesting a possible relation between the level effect and firms’ 
investment activities as captured by the asset growth variable.  The results from Model (1) and 
Model (2) are consistent with the findings by BCGW (2010). Without controlling for the 
investment in new growth options, there is no evidence that the debt-equity composition of net 
external financing is related to future stock returns.  
In Model (3) and Model (4), we add R&D as a control variable to Model (1) and Model 
(2). Model (5) includes a high R&D dummy, which takes the value of one for firms with R&D 
expenditure higher than 5% of lagged assets and 0 otherwise, to control for the investment-in-   
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Table 1.6. Regression of year-head stock returns on equity ratio and net external financing 
 
This table reports the regression of year-ahead stock returns on net external financing and equity ratio. The dependent variable is the 12-month buy-and-hold return (BHARs). We 
calculate the independent variables at the end of June of each year t and match them with BHARs from July of year t to June of year t + 1. NF is net external financing, defined as 
the net amount of cash from issuing and repurchasing debt and equity securities scaled by lagged assets. ER is the decile ranking for equity ratio, defined as the proportion of net 
equity to net cash raised. The decile ranking is transformed to a value between -0.5 to 0.5. POSNF is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms with positive net 
external financing. NEGNF is an indicator variable that takes the value of one firms with negative net external financing. Log(MV) is the logarithm of the market value of equity at 
the end of June of year t. Log(B/M) is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity as of the fiscal year end that occur in calendar year t – 1 scaled 
by the market value of equity at the end of December of year t - 1. Growth is the change in assets scaled by lagged assets. ROA is operating income before depreciation scaled by 
lagged book assets. The models are estimated using the Fama MecBeth procedure. The standard errors are calculated with the time series of quarterly coefficients, with the 
autocorrelation in the quarterly coefficients adjusted using the method in Abarranel and Bernard (2000). The t statistics are reported in the parentheses. The adjusted R2 statistics 
are the mean adjusted R2 of the annual regressions. 
 
                              
  Intercept 
POSNF 
×NF 
NEGNF 
×NF 
POSNF 
×ER
dec
 
NEGNF 
×ER
dec
 POSNF Log(MV) Log(BM) MOM Growth ROA R&D 
High 
 R&D 
Adjusted 
 R
2
 (%) 
(1) 0.2739 -0.1801 -0.0702 -0.0199 0.0202 -0.0233 -0.0072 0.0378 0.0300 
    
5.15 
 
(2.26) (-8.80) (-0.69) (-0.97) (1.65) (-3.67) (-1.00) (4.67) (1.76) 
     
               (2) 0.2766 -0.0156 -0.0098 -0.0112 0.0155 -0.0258 -0.0092 0.0392 0.0274 -0.0780 0.1650 
  
5.67 
 
(2.37) (-0.61) (-0.10) (-0.61) (1.33) (-4.30) (-1.38) (4.80) (1.70) (-8.59) (3.88) 
   
               (3) 0.2436 -0.2071 -0.1000 -0.0469 0.0214 -0.0220 -0.0055 0.0474 0.0296 
  
0.4923 
 
5.82 
 
(2.11) (-8.38) (-1.02) (-3.55) (1.77) (-3.14) (-0.81) (7.87) (1.76) 
  
(3.23) 
  
               (4) 0.2543 -0.0211 -0.0260 -0.0403 0.0151 -0.0259 -0.0089 0.0501 0.0264 -0.0861 0.2281 0.5989 
 
6.33 
 
(2.26) (-0.79) (-0.28) (-3.10) (1.27) (-3.99) (-1.36) (7.71) (1.61) (-9.51) (6.45) (3.93) 
  
               (5) 0.2515 -0.0077 -0.0246 -0.0384 0.0124 -0.0266 -0.0084 0.0468 0.0259 -0.0805 0.1935 
 
0.0855 6.31 
 
(2.24) (-0.33) (-0.25) (-3.07) (1.02) (-4.43) (-1.30) (7.10) (1.62) (-9.21) (5.32) 
 
(3.09) 
 
               (6) 0.2495 -0.0709 -0.0157 -0.0505 0.0237 -0.0289 -0.0085 0.0445 0.0339 -0.0662 0.2414 
  
5.46 
  (2.14) (-2.69) (-0.16) (-2.97) (2.09) (-4.16) (-1.22) (5.15) (2.01) (-7.91) (4.97)       
               (7) 0.2755 -0.1234 0.0456 -0.0433 0.0227 -0.0401 -0.0093 0.0464 0.0352 -0.0552 0.2329 
  
5.38 
 
(2.21) (-2.61) (0.60) (-1.98) (1.10) (-3.91) (-1.21) (5.47) (1.86) (-2.65) (4.22) 
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growth-options effect. For all three models, the coefficients for POSNF × ER
dec
 turn statistically 
significant. For example, in Model (4), the coefficient for POSNF × ER is -0.0469, which is 3.6 
standard errors away from 0. Therefore, a hedge portfolio formed by longing the capital raising 
firms in the lowest equity ratio decile and shorting those in the highest decile earn 4.69% per year. 
This is a conservative estimate of the market timing effect related to firms’ debt-equity choices 
because R&D spending does not fully control for investment in growth options.  
In Models (3), (4) and (5), we assume that set missing R&D value to zero, assuming that 
firms with missing R&D spend zero or negligible amount on research and development
15
. To 
make sure that our results are not driven by this assumption, we estimate two additional models 
that do not explicitly use R&D as a control variable. In Model (6), we estimate Model (2) after 
excluding firms that are known to have R&D expenditure higher than 5% of lagged assets. In 
Model (7), we estimate Model (2) after excluding firms that are known to have R&D expenditure 
higher than 5% of lagged assets and those with missing R&D.  In Model (6), the coefficient for 
the POSNF × ER
dec
 variable is -0.0505, which is 2.97 standard errors away from zero. In Model 
(7), the coefficient for the POSNF × ER
dec
 variable is -0.0433, with a t statistic of -1.98. The 
results in these two models provide further evidence that firms issuing more equity relative to 
debt earn lower year-ahead stock returns after partially controlling for the investment-in-growth-
options effect in the models. 
The R&D related variables are significantly positive in all models where they are present. 
For example, the coefficient for the high R&D dummy in Model (5) is 0.0855, indicating that 
high R&D firms earn 8.55% more per annum than low R&D firms. However, in Model (4) of 
Table 1.3, the coefficients for R&D are not significant, providing no evidence that investors are 
                                                          
15
 By the SEC rule adopted in 1972, firms are required to report estimated amount of R&D when (a) it is material, (b) it 
exceeds 1% of sales, or (c) a policy or deferral or amortization of R&D expenses is pursued. If firms consider their 
R&D spending immaterial and indicate this, e.g., by reporting 0 R&D in 10K, Compustat will record 0. A Comustat 
record of  “not available” could happen in three situations: (a)  firms say nothing about R&D in 10K, (b) firms’ R&D 
information is randomly missing, or (c) firms report R&D, but Compustat concludes that their definitions of R&D do 
not  conform (Griliches, 1984). Julio, Kim and Weisbach (2008) suggests that it is “typical in the previous literature” to 
set missing R&D to 0. 
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systematically surprised by high R&D firms at the information rich earnings announcement 
events. Thus, the higher year-ahead returns on R&D are more likely to be the rationally expected 
components of stock returns than the unexpected components related to the surprises to investors. 
This is consistent with the view that investors require higher return for holding the equities of 
high R&D firms (Berk, Green and Naik (2004) and Li (forthcoming)). More importantly, this 
explains why the earnings announcement test can detect evidence of market timing without 
including R&D as a control variable.  Since the R&D related stock returns effects, which we use 
as a proxy for the investment-in-growth-options effect, are rationally expected, they are spread 
more smoothly over the year. However, the market timing effect is more concentrated during the 
earnings announcement periods. Therefore, relative to the investment-in-growth-options effect, 
the market timing effect is stronger during the earnings announcement days. In other words, the 
market timing effect related to the debt-equity composition of external financing is more easily 
detected at earnings announcements, but offset by the new growth options effect during other 
time of the year. 
 
5. Equity ratio and analysts’ forecasts of firms’ long term growth rates 
 
Previous research shows that expectational errors in long term growth rates are closely 
related to stock market predictability (e.g., Dechow and Sloan (1997) and La Porta (1996)). For 
example, Dechow and Sloan (1997) find that naïve reliance on analysts’ forecasts of future 
earnings growth can explain over half of the higher returns to contrarian investment strategies.  In 
search for further evidence for the market timing hypothesis, we examine the relation between 
equity ratio and market expectation of long term growth rates in this section. If the market timing 
hypothesis holds, firms will issue more equity relative to debt when the market expectations, as 
proxied by analysts’ forecasts, are overly optimistic. Consequently, heavy equity issuers will have 
more negative forecast errors than heavy debt issuers. 
35 
 
Following previous studies, we use the mean analysts’ forecast (LTG) in the I/B/S/E 
database as the proxy for market expectations about firms’ long term growth rates. The LTG 
variable is not available for all firms. We thus need to decide whether to use the NF × ER 
breakpoints for the entire sample or to re-sort the NF × ER portfolios for these firms alone. We 
choose to use the NF × ER breakpoints for the entire sample so that the results are more 
comparable across sections. We also re-sort the firms into NF × ER breakpoints for robustness 
check and find stronger support for our hypothesis. 
Table 1.7 presents the analysts’ forecasts errors in firms’ long term growth rates (LTGFE) 
by external financing (NF) and equity ratio (ER). Panel A presents the raw LTGFEs for capital 
raising firms (NF > 0). The mean LTGFEs for all NF × ER portfolios are negative, suggesting 
that analysts are in general overly optimistic about firms’ growth prospects. More importantly, 
holding the NF quartiles constant, the mean LTGFEs generally decrease as we move from the 
lowest ER portfolios to the highest ER portfolios. The LTGFE spreads between the low and high 
ER portfolios range from 4.84% to 10.76%, all with statistically significant t values. These results 
suggest that firms choose to issue more equity relative to debt when their growth prospects are 
more overestimated by the market.  
Strictly speaking, it is unnecessary to make benchmark-adjustments to LTGFEs for 
testing the market timing hypothesis. Equity market timers will issue more equities relative to 
debt when the market severely overestimates their growth prospects, regardless of whether the 
analysts’ overoptimism is driven by size, book-to-market ratio or momentum. We nevertheless 
examine the benchmark-adjusted LTGFEs to assess whether analysts are more optimistic about 
equity issuers than they are about debt issuers with similar size, book-to-market ratio and 
momentum. Panel B presents the benchmark-adjusted LTGFEs for firms raising capital (NF > 0). 
Holding the NF quartiles constant, the benchmark-adjusted LTGFEs turn more negative as equity 
ratio increases. The low-minus-high LTGFE spreads range from 2.21% to 8.27%. One of the 
spreads is statistically significant at 10% significance level and all three others at 1% significance 
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Table 1.7. Analysts’ forecast errors in long term growth rate by net external financing and equity ratio 
 
This table reports the errors in analysts’ forecasts of long term growth rate by net external financing (NF) and equity ratio (ER) quartiles.  At the end of June of each year t, we sort 
firms into quartiles by NF. Then we divide each NF portfolio into quartiles by ER. We calculate analysts’ forecast errors as realized future growth rates minus analysts’ forecasts of 
long term growth rates. The future growth rates in EPS are obtained by fitting an ordinary least squares line through the logarithm of the EPS (excluding extraordinary items) 
reported for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t – 1 and the EPS for the next five years. The analysts’ forecasts of long term growth rates are the mean analysts’ forecasts of 
five year growth rate in the I/B/E/S database that are available in June of year t. The forecast errors presented in the table are averages over all formation periods. For each year, we 
also calculate the forecast error spreads between the lowest NF (ER) portfolios and the highest NF (ER) portfolios. The time series standard errors of these spreads are used to 
calculate the t-statistics in the parentheses. Panel A presents the raw growth rate forecasts errors for capital raising firms (NF >0). Panel B presents the benchmark-adjusted growth 
rate forecast errors for capital raising firms (NF > 0). The benchmark-adjusted growth rate forecast errors are defined as raw growth rate forecast errors minus the average growth 
rate forecast errors of firms with similar size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. Panel C presents the raw growth rate forecast errors for capital distributing firms (NF < 0). 
Panel D presents the benchmark-adjusted growth rate forecast errors for capital distributing firms (NF < 0). 
 
Panel A: Raw LTG forecast errors, NF > 0 
 
Panel B: Benchmark-adjusted LTG forecast errors, NF > 0 
                   
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
  
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
 
 
Low -12.92 -13.86 -14.11 -16.99 
 
4.07 (2.68) 
  
Low 0.72 0.71 1.08 0.80 
 
-0.08 (-0.06) 
Equity 2 -14.94 -11.94 -15.15 -18.39 
 
3.46 (1.72) 
 
Equity 2 -0.27 2.54 0.20 -0.27 
 
0.00 (0.00) 
Ratio 3 -19.40 -14.19 -17.64 -22.08 
 
2.68 (1.09) 
 
Ratio 3 -1.13 1.17 -2.43 -1.97 
 
0.84 (0.47) 
 
High -20.55 -18.70 -21.97 -27.75 
 
7.20 (4.61) 
  
High -2.52 -1.50 -3.59 -7.47 
 
4.95 (3.85) 
                   
 
L-H 7.63 4.84 7.86 10.76 
      
3.24 2.21 4.67 8.27 
       (6.87) (2.73) (5.23) (4.63)       
 
    (3.82) (1.86) (4.04) (4.89)       
                   Panel C: Raw LTG forecast errors, NF < 0 
 
Panel D: Benchmark-adjusted LTG forecast errors, NF < 0 
                   
  
Net External Financing 
      
Net External Financing 
   
  
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
    
Low 2 3 High 
 
L-H 
 
 
Low -17.03 -14.37 -14.95 -16.55 
 
-0.48 (-0.31) 
  
Low 0.84 1.35 0.60 -0.66 
 
1.50 (1.08) 
Equity 2 -14.03 -8.16 -12.24 -12.28 
 
-1.75 (-1.03) 
 
Equity 2 1.80 5.38 2.82 2.45 
 
-0.65 (-0.43) 
Ratio 3 -18.21 -12.91 -13.99 -14.42 
 
-3.79 (-1.55) 
 
Ratio 3 -2.32 1.27 -0.15 0.23 
 
-2.55 (-0.97) 
 
High -18.34 -16.47 -16.38 -14.83 
 
-3.51 (-4.05) 
  
High 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.48 
 
-0.48 (-0.63) 
                   
 
L-H 1.31 2.09 1.43 -1.72 
     
L-H 0.84 1.40 0.57 -1.14 
       (0.93) (1.52) (1.02) (-1.51)       
 
    (0.61) (1.00) (0.44) (-1.15)       
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level. The evidence in Panel B suggests that, controlling for size, book-to-market ratio and 
momentum, analysts’ forecasts are still more biased for equity issuers than for debt issuers. 
In Panels C and D, we present the raw and benchmark-adjusted LTGFEs for capital 
distributing firms (NF < 0). There appears to be no clear relation between ER and LTGFEs 
among the capital distributing firms. This is consistent with our findings in Sections 3 and 4 about 
the relation between ER and future stock returns among capital distributing firms. 
  
6. Aggregate data 
 
Our analyses on earnings announcement returns, year-ahead stock returns and analysts’ 
forecasts of firms’ long term growth rates suggest that managers tend to issue more equities 
relative to debt when their firms are more overvalued by the market. We argue that BCGW (2010) 
finds no evidence for market timing because of a confounding new growth options effect in the 
data. The same argument helps to explain the controversy surrounding aggregate market timing. 
Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that equity share in new issues, an aggregate market timing 
variable constructed in the same sprit as the equity ratio in this paper, has predictive power for 
future stock market returns. Consistent with the market timing hypothesis, they find that there is a 
negative relation between equity share in new issues and future aggregate market returns. BCGW 
(2010) replicate Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) tests and find the negative relation between equity 
share in new issues and future stock returns holds only for the sample period before 1997. When 
they include years after 1997 into the sample, the relation between future stock market return and 
equity share in new issues becomes statistically insignificant. They thus conclude that Baker and 
Wugler’s (2006) findings may be specific to the data sample period before 1997.  
One possible reason why equity share in new issues loses its predictive power after 
including the most recent data into the sample is that the confounding investment-in-growth-
options effect has turned stronger over the years. Figure 1.1 plots the fraction of high R&D firms,  
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Figure 1.1. Fraction of high R&D firms in the sample 
 
This figure plots the fraction of firms with high R&D spending over the years. Firms with R&D spending higher than 5% 
of lagged assets is defined as a high R&D firm. 
 
defined as firms with R&D spending higher than 5% of lagged assets, in our sample. In 1972, 
only about 7% of the firms in our sample are classified as high R&D firms. The fraction has 
grown steadily over the years. By 2008, about 30% of the firms in our sample have R&D 
expenditure higher than 5% of lagged assets. Since high R&D firms are more likely to invest in 
new growth options, the trend in Figure 1.1 suggests that the confounding effect should have 
turned stronger over the years. Without controlling for this confounding effect, the predictive 
power of the equity issue in new issues will become weaker over the sample period. Since the 
fraction of high R&D firms are highest for years after 1997, it is not surprising that the negative 
relation between the equity issue in new issues and future stock market return disappears when 
the later years are included in the sample. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine whether the debt-equity composition of net external financing 
predicts future stock returns. We find firms issuing more equity relative to debt tend to have 
0%
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lower earnings announcement returns in the subsequent year. The effect still exists after 
controlling for the level of external financing and firm characteristics that are known to affect 
cross-sectional stock returns. The evidence is more consistent with the mispricing hypothesis than 
with the investment based explanations for financing anomalies. 
Then we investigate why previous research finds that there is no relation between the 
composition of external financing and future stock returns after controlling for the level of 
external financing. We hypothesize that there is a confounding investment-in-growth-options 
effect that offsets the market timing effect in the data. That is, firms are more likely to use equity 
to finance their investment in new growth options. By real options theory, the investment in 
growth options can cause an increase in the firms’ required rates of return. This can potentially 
offsets the market timing effect related to firms’ debt-equity choices. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, we find a negative relation between equity ratio and year-ahead stock returns after 
controlling for the new growth options effect. In addition, we examine the relation between firms’ 
debt-equity choices and analysts’ forecasts of firms’ long term growth rates. We find analysts’ 
forecasts are systematically more overoptimistic for heavy equity issuers than heavy debt issuers. 
This provides further support for the mispricing hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
A NEW APPROACH FOR EVALUATING CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The major theories of capital structure suggest that firms base their financing decisions 
on various cost-benefit considerations. The static-tradeoff theory predicts that the optimal 
leverage ratio reflects a tradeoff between the cost of bankruptcy and the value of the tax shield 
associated with interest deductions. The pecking order explanation of Myers and Majluff (1984) 
suggests that firms prefer internal to external financing and debt to equity financing due to 
concerns over adverse selection costs. Agency theory implies that a similar financing hierarchy 
can reduce the agency costs associated with the free cash flow problem. Since firms with different 
characteristics face different costs and benefits of debt financing, the theories imply that relations 
exist between firms’ leverage and various firm characteristics. The empirical literature has 
identified a large number of capital structure determinants. Frank and Goyal (2009) re-examine 
previously identified variables and find that six leverage factors explain about 30% of the 
variation in firm leverage ratios.  
As capital structure determinants evolve over time, changes in the costs and benefits of 
debt financing are likely to occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect time-series variation in 
capital structure determinants to have an impact on firms’ debt ratios. This is a popular 
assumption in capital structure studies. For example, the popular partial adjustment model 
explicitly treats target leverage as a function of firm characteristics and then estimates the speed 
of adjustment toward the target (Hovakimia, Opler and Titman, 2001, Fama and French, 2002, 
Kayhan and Titman, 2007, Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
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However, recent evidence documented in Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) casts 
doubt on the importance of the previously identified determinants. They find that pooled OLS 
regressions using previously known determinants can only explain 18% - 29% of the variation in 
firm leverage ratios, whereas models with firm fixed effects can explain as much as 60%. Since 
firm fixed effects are included to capture unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity, they conclude 
that “the majority of the variation in leverage is time invariant and largely unexplained by 
previously identified capital structure determinants”. They also interpret their findings as 
evidence that firms rebalance toward time-invariant leverage targets
16
.  
These findings are interesting yet puzzling. In particular, one of the samples they use is a 
“Survivor” sample, which consists of firms with more than twenty years of non-missing data. 
Over the twenty year plus period, many firms experience nontrivial changes in firm 
characteristics. Since these changes involve factors associated with changes in the costs and 
benefits of debt financing, it is puzzling why such changes have only minimal effects on the time 
series variation of firms’ leverage ratios17.  
The standard fixed effect model in finance controls for firm-specific heterogeneity by 
allowing firms to have heterogeneous intercepts. However, this model ignores the possibility that 
some slope coefficients can also be heterogeneous. Yet, it is likely that the marginal effects of 
some of these factors can vary across firms for at least two reasons. First, some leverage 
determinants, such as accounting ratios, are imperfect proxies for the underlying economic factors. 
Because firms differ in their accounting practices and/or in the nature of their assets, the same 
unit of change in an accounting variable can have different economic implications for different 
firms. Consequently, firms are likely to respond differently. For example, in response to an 
                                                          
16
 Their findings are inconsistent with the capital structure irrelevance argument because there is no reason for firms to 
stick to a particular leverage level over extended periods if capital structure is irrelevant. 
17
 Based on firms’ time series ranges in leverage, DeAngelo and Roll (2011) argue that capital structure stability is 
virtually always a temporary phenomenon. A potential concern over their evidence is that ranges in leverage could be 
affected by the general shift away from debt conservatism since the 1950s and by temporary, extreme fluctuations in 
debt ratios. 
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increase in firm size, firms that routinely use off-balance-sheet financing may adjust their capital 
structures by changing the amount of their operating leasing obligations, which has no direct 
effect on leverage as it is conventionally defined. Second, the marginal effects of the capital 
structure determinants may be conditional on other factors. Meyers (2003) suggests that capital 
structure theories are conditional theories. Each works better in some conditions than others. 
Some of the conditional factors can be unobservable. For example, management style (Bertrand 
and Scholar, 2003), financing friction and creditor relations may all affect how firms respond to 
the changes in the capital structure determinants of leverage. Furthermore, the marginal effects of 
a determinant can be conditional on other known determinants. For example, firms with more 
tangible assets have more attractive collateral to reassure lenders. Thus, an incremental change in 
total assets of such firms is likely to have higher marginal effects on their debt capacity and 
capital structure.  In other words, there can be interaction effects between total assets and asset 
tangibility, which is illustrated by our example. 
In this paper, we show that the puzzle documented by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 
(2008) can be explained by the implicit assumption of a homogenous slope for leverage 
determinants. We show that the fixed effect model can produce “pseudo fixed effects” when they 
are used with data generating from firms that are characterized by heterogeneous slopes. Such 
fixed effects are “pseudo” in the sense that they are mechanical effects caused by neglecting slope 
heterogeneity. They exist even in situations where the variation in leverage is driven completely 
by the changes in capital structure determinants. Moreover, citing Pesaran and Smith (1995), we 
show that the fixed coefficient models can underestimate the effects of the capital structure 
determinants in the partial adjustment model. Therefore, the evidence in Lemmon, Roberts and 
Zender (2008) does not necessarily mean that target leverage ratios are time invariant, nor does it 
necessarily imply that leverage changes are better explained by firm fixed effects than by 
previously identified leverage determinants.  
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For this alternative explanation to be convincing, we need to uncover evidence that the 
data generating process for firm leverage ratios is indeed characterized by heterogeneous slope 
coefficients. One straightforward way to obtain such evidence is to run a horse race between a 
heterogeneous coefficient model and a fixed effect model. However, the application of the 
heterogeneous coefficient models requires a relatively long time series for each firm, causing 
potential concerns over survivorship bias. We address the problem by taking two approaches, one 
based on the full sample of firms and the other based on a Survivor sample. We estimate 
conventional regression models to the general sample and heterogeneous coefficient models to 
the Survivor sample. There are two advantages to studying the long time series in the Survivor 
sample. First, because there are longer time series for each sample firm, we can investigate to 
what extent the variation in firms’ leverage is explained by the time-series variation in capital 
structure determinants.  In this sense, the sample is comparable to the Survivor sample used by 
Lemmon, Robert and Zenders (2008). Second, the Survivor sample allows us to run a horse race 
between the fixed effect model and heterogeneous coefficient model. We study the general 
sample mainly to show that slope heterogeneity exists generally among firms. 
Let’s start from the evidence from the Survivor sample. Using the  ̃  test recently 
developed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), we formally test and reject the hypothesis of slope 
homogeneity. We thus conclude that the heterogeneity in the marginal effects of some leverage 
determinants is a credible alternative model for testing the determinants of firm leverage ratios. 
To develop a more reliable assessment of the importance of capital structure determinants, 
we estimate models of leverage using heterogeneous coefficient methods. Following Hsiao 
(2003), we account for slope heterogeneity by running separate OLS regressions for each firm 
and by fitting random coefficient and/or multilevel regressions, with more focus on the latter 
method. The random coefficient model allows the slopes of leverage models to vary randomly 
across firms. The multilevel model allows the slopes of leverage models to vary by firm 
characteristics. We find that the heterogeneous coefficient models explain more variation in 
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leverage than the fixed effect model. Specifically, the random coefficient models have adjusted 
    statistics above 0.7. Moreover, the random coefficient model with heterogeneous slopes, but a 
homogeneous intercept has an adjusted    of 0.7245, whereas the model with both heterogeneous 
intercepts and heterogeneous slopes has an adjusted    of 0.7163. Therefore, when 
heterogeneous slopes are specified for the capital structure determinants, adding heterogeneous 
intercepts to the model has only minimal effects on model fit. To address concerns about model 
over-fitting, we compare the out-of-sample predictive performances of the two models. The 
random coefficient models consistently outperform the LSDV (least square dummy variable) and 
fixed effect models in terms of mean squared forecasting errors (MSE).  Overall, the models’ 
goodness of fit statistics suggest that the firm-specific heterogeneity in leverage determinants is  
better modeled by heterogeneous slopes than by heterogeneous intercepts, at least for firms in the 
Survivor sample. In other words, it is more appropriate to view firms as having heterogeneous 
responses to changes in capital structure determinants than to view firms as having time-invariant 
firm-specific leverage ratios (i.e., the firm fixed effects model). This conclusion is inconsistent 
with the commonly held view that firm leverage targets are time invariant.  
The results from the Survivor sample suggest that slope heterogeneity can be a relevant 
explanation for the findings of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). For the general sample, we 
focus on the following two issues. First, we want to show that there is also substantial slope 
heterogeneity in the general sample. Second, we examine whether the cross-sectional differences 
in slopes are related to economically meaningful factors. We first examine the relation between 
slope heterogeneity and firm characteristics. As previously explained, a firm’s slope coefficients 
can be affected by various observable and unobservable factors. Our goal is not to identify all 
such factors, but simply to show that slope heterogeneity is related to meaningful economic 
factors.  
We find the slope heterogeneity in leverage models are related to the long term 
components of several slope determinants, such as firm size, profitability, MV/BV, tangibility 
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and earnings volatility. The statistically significant relations that we identify suggest that financial 
constraints can play a role in determining slope heterogeneity. For example, firms with lower 
tangibility and firms with higher earnings volatility may face more financial constraints because 
they are associated with more information asymmetry from the investors’ perspective. We find 
these firms are less sensitive to most capital structure determinants. Meyer’s (2003) argument 
about the conditional applicability of the pecking order theory could also explain the cross-
sectional differences in slope coefficients. For example, we find that larger firms and firms with 
fewer growth opportunities, higher profitability or more stable cash flows are more sensitive to 
the changes in profitability. This is consistent with his argument that “cash cows” face the 
greatest pressure to follow the pecking order. Moreover, we achieve meaningful improvements in 
adjusted    when we allow the slope coefficients in the leverage models to vary with the long 
term components of these variables. These results suggest that the cross-sectional heterogeneity 
in slope coefficients is related to meaningful economic factors and can be explained by existing 
theories. It is unlikely that the slope heterogeneity in leverage models is merely a statistical 
artifact. 
Finally, we examine the slope heterogeneity across industries. We estimate the leverage 
models separately for each industry with more than 200 observations and report the distribution 
of the coefficients across firms. We find substantial cross industry heterogeneity in slopes. For 
example, the profitability coefficient is – 0.6161 at the 20% percentile and – 0.1525 at the 80% 
percentile.  Thus, the industries at the 20% percentile are almost four times more sensitive to the 
variation in internal cash flows than those at the 80% percentile. The substantial cross industry 
slope heterogeneity provides further evidence that slope homogeneity is an unlikely to be a 
descriptively valid assumption for target leverage ratios. Moreover, we find we can substantially 
improve on the OLS model’s fit by allowing the coefficients of the leverage models to vary by 
industry and firm characteristics. This provides further evidence that the slope heterogeneity in 
the leverage models is related to economically meaningful firm and industry factors.  In addition, 
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we find adding industry-specific intercepts adds remarkably little to the model fit when 
heterogeneous slopes are specified for different industries. In contrast, even when the model 
includes industry fixed effects, meaningful improvements in adjusted    can still be achieved by 
allowing industry-specific slopes. This indicates that firms in the same industry do share 
similarities in their capital structure decisions. However, such similarities are reflected not so 
much by a specific level of leverage that the industry is associated with as it is by how firms in 
the industry respond to changes in capital structure determinants.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how the neglected slope 
heterogeneity can cause “pseudo fixed effects”. Section 3 introduces the estimation methods for 
heterogeneous panels, which will be used on the Survivor sample in Section 5. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 presents the evidence from the Survivor sample. Section 6 provides 
the evidence from the general sample. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. “Pseudo Fixed Effects” 
 
Existing capital structure studies control for firm-specific heterogeneity by allowing firms 
to have heterogeneous intercepts in their models. However, firm-specific heterogeneity can also 
be reflected in heterogeneous slope coefficients. In this section, we illustrate that alternative 
interpretations are possible for Lemmon, Robert and Zender’s (2008) findings when the leverage 
models are characterized with heterogeneous slopes. 
When different firms have different coefficients for the capital structure determinants, the 
data generating process for leverage can be represented by equations (1) and (2). 
     ∑             
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where      is the leverage of firm i at time t and           the kth capital structure determinant for 
firm i. In equation (2),    is the average effect across firms and      the firm-specific deviation 
from   . Substitute equation (1) into equation (2), we obtain 
     ∑           
 
   
 ∑             
 
   
                                                                                             
           ∑           
 
   
 ∑      ̅   
 
   ⏟     
  
 ∑     ̈       
 
   
     
⏟                    
    
                                                  
where  ̅    is the time-series mean of          for firm i and  ̈        the deviation from  ̅   . 
The existing research in capital structure uses econometric methods that assume 
homogeneous slopes, such as the pooled OLS regression, the least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) regression or the fixed effect model. When equation (4) is estimated using the pooled 
OLS method, the last three terms in the equation become the error term ε
   
. When the model is 
estimated using the LSDV method or the fixed effect method, the ∑      ̅   
 
    term is effectively 
a “fixed effect”. Notice that the model in equations (1) and (2) contains no firm-specific 
intercepts. Equation (4) shows that the “pseudo fixed effect”    can arise even if the variation in 
leverage is driven solely by the time series variation in the capital structure determinants. 
Therefore, the presence of firm fixed effects does not necessarily mean that the time-series 
variation of the capital structure determinants is unimportant. Nor do they necessarily imply that 
firms’ leverage targets are time invariant.  
The neglect of slope heterogeneity can be one of the reasons why the adjustment speeds 
estimated using fixed effect models are insensitive to the inclusion of the capital structure 
determinants (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008). Under the assumption of slope heterogeneity, 
the partial adjustment model can be represented by equations (5) - (7).  
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                        ∑            
 
   
                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                              
In equations (6) and (7),   and    are the average effects across firms and    and      the 
individual deviation from   and   . Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (5) and 
rearranging terms, we obtain 
              ∑           
 
   
            ∑                  
 
   ⏟     
    
                                     
The existing research interprets      as the average capital structure adjustment speed. 
If equation (8) is estimated using a model with homogeneous slopes, the           and 
∑             
 
    terms enter into the error term ε   . Pesaran and Smith (1995) point out there are 
three problems associated with the error term ε
   
. First, the correlation between         and      
causes what is often known as the short panel bias. Previous research in capital structure 
addresses the problem using various instrument variable methods (Flannary and Hankins, 2007, 
Lemmon, Roberts, Zender, 2008,  Huang and Ritter, 2007). Second, the serial correlations in 
η
 
       and ∑             
 
    induce the serial correlation in the error terms. Third, due to the 
presence of the         and ∑             
 
    terms, the error term is contemporaneously 
correlated with the regressors. Consequently, the models assuming homogeneous coefficients will 
produce inconsistent estimates of   and   .  It is unlikely that the problem can be solved with 
instrument variable methods. To be a valid instrument, a variable must be correlated with        
and/or         . However, because          and              are components of ε   , any such 
variable will be correlated with ε
   
, rendering them invalid instruments. 
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Pesaran and Smith (1995) derive the signs of the biases for the homogeneous coefficient 
model estimates of λ̂ and   ̂. They show that λ
̂
  will be biased toward one when          has 
positive autocorrelation.   ̂ will be biased toward zero regardless of the autocorrelation structure 
of         .  When   ̂ is biased toward zero, the homogeneous coefficient models underestimate 
the effects of the capital structure determinants. In other words, the homogeneous coefficient 
models fail to adequately account for the changes in leverage targets that are caused by the 
changes in the determinants. They overestimate the effect of the lagged leverage and 
underestimate the effects of the capital structure determinants. This can partially explain why the 
adjustment speed changes little before and after including the capital structure determinants into 
the fixed effect models (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008).  
So far we have demonstrated that the neglected slope heterogeneity can explain the 
findings documented by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). For this explanation to be relevant, 
we need the evidence that the data generating process for firms’ leverage is indeed characterized 
with heterogeneous slope coefficients. We will formally test the assumption of slope 
homogeneity in Section 5. 
 
3. Estimation methods for heterogeneous panels 
 
This section introduces the econometric methods for estimating heterogeneous panel 
models. For many applications in finance, the heterogeneous panel methods are unnecessary even 
when the data generating processes are characterized with heterogeneous slopes. This is because 
financial economists are mainly interested in the average effects. As shown by Zellner (1969), the 
homogeneous coefficient models can produce consistent estimates of the average effects as long 
as the regressors are exogenous and the slopes differ randomly across groups. However, the 
average effects are not the sole concern in this paper. In this paper, we are interested in assessing 
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the percentage of variation in leverage that are explained by the capital structure determinants. To 
draw conclusions about whether the target leverage is time invariant, we also need evidence about 
whether the heterogeneous slopes assumption is more appropriate than the heterogeneous 
intercepts assumptions.  
Heterogeneous panel models can be estimated using either Bayesian approaches or 
classic approaches. Classic approaches involve estimating separate OLS regressions for each firm 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995, Hsiao, 2003) or estimating random coefficient/multilevel models
18
.  I 
will focus more on the latter in this paper. 
For convenience, the models in equations (1) – (2) are rewritten as 
                                                                                                                             (9) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
In equations (9) and (10),    is the vector of coefficients for the capital structure determinants,    
the vector of leverage for firm i and    the data matrix of capital structure determinants. The firm-
specific components γ
 
 are assumed to have zero means and constant covariance  . The error 
term    is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance   
 . Substitute 
equation (9) into equation (10), we obtain 
                                                                                                                                    
Swamy (1970) shows that θ can be estimated using the generalized least square estimator 
 ̂  (∑  
′
  
    
 
   
)
  
(∑  
′
  
    
 
   
)                                                                                 
                                                          
18 In standard financial econometrics, the fixed (random) effect refers to the firm-specific intercepts that are correlated 
(uncorrelated) with the regressors. In the random coefficient/multilevel models literature, the fixed effect refers to a 
parameter (either an intercept or a slope coefficient) that is assumed to be constant and random effect a parameter that 
varies randomly across firms or over time. In this paper, the term fixed effect takes the meaning as in standard financial 
econometrics. When we discuss the random coefficient/multilevel models, we will refer to constant parameters 
explicitly as homogenous intercepts or homogeneous (slope) coefficients and random parameters explicitly as 
heterogeneous intercepts or heterogeneous (slope) coefficients.  
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where the covariance matrix    equals   Δ  
′
   
   . The best linear unbiased estimator for the 
firm-specific coefficient vector     (Hsiao, 2003) is 
 ̂   ̂  Δ  
′
  
  (      ̂)                                                                                                     
The estimators in equations (12) and (13) are infeasible because the variance components are 
unobservable in practice. Therefore, we need to estimate the variance components in a first-stage 
estimation and then substitute the resulting estimates into equations (12) and (13) to obtain  ̂ and 
 ̂ in a second stage. The existing random coefficient models differ mainly in how the variance 
components are estimated. In this paper, we use the likelihood based approach (Pinheiro and 
Bates, 2000)
19
, which has been shown to be more accurate than the classic Swamy-Hsiao random 
coefficient model (Beck and Katz, 2006).   
If the firm-specific coefficients are correlated with the regressors, the GLS estimator of 
the mean coefficient vector can be biased (Mundlak, 1978, Hsiao, 2003). We address this concern 
using two different methods. First, we estimate the random coefficient models using demeaned 
data. From equation (3), the model for demeaned data can be written as 
 ̈    ∑    ̈       
 
    ∑      ̈       
 
                                                                                   
where  ̈    and  ̈        are the deviations from the time-series means for each firm. From equation 
(14), it is clear that    and      also can be estimated from the demeaned data. Since the firm-
specific means are subtracted from the variables in equation (14), the correlation between the 
firm-specific      and the regressors is not an issue. Second, following Mundlak (1978) and Hsiao 
(2003), we estimate equation (11) along with auxiliary equations for the coefficient vector    as a 
function of the ith firm’s observed explanatory variables. Specifically, the following equation is 
specified for the firm-specific slope      in equation (3). 
     ∑     ̅   
 
   
                                                                                                                                  
                                                          
19 We implement the model using SAS proc mixed procedure.  
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In equation (15),  ̅    is the firm-specific time series mean of the explanatory variable     . 
Equation (15) can then be substituted into equation (3) to obtain the reduced form model. The 
resulting model contains both the original explanatory variables and the interaction terms between 
the explanatory variables and time series means. Some econometricians view the resulting model 
as a special class of the random coefficient model. Others call such models multilevel models. 
For convenience, we call it a multilevel model.  More details about the multilevel model can be 
found in Section 5. 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
For the general sample, we start from all non-financial (SIC codes 6000 – 6999), non-
utilities (SIC codes 4900 – 4999) companies in the annual Compustat Xpressfeed database 
between 1970 and 2007. We require that sample firms have positive assets and sales. 
Observations with missing data for market leverage or any of the variables in the regression 
models are deleted. Following previous research, we omit observations with leverage below 0 or 
above 1 and truncate relevant ratios at 1% and 99%. In addition, we require that the sample 
observations have non-missing values for the variables in the regression models. Because time 
series means of the variables are used in part of the analysis, we require that sample firms have at 
least five years of data. Time series means are less meaningful when the time series is less than 
five years. The actual data used for the regression models are chosen from this general sample 
and may vary from test to test. For example, when we estimate industry-specific regressions, we 
require that the sample firms be in industries with at least 200 observations. We will explain the 
necessary details when we discuss the specific tests. The Survivor sample is similarly constructed, 
except that the sample firms must have 20 years of data between 1988 and 2007.  
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Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample companies. The reported 
variables include book leverage, market leverage and various capital structure determinants. The 
market leverage is the ratio of total debt over the sum of debt and market value of equity. Book 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for our samples. The Survivor sample consists of 894 non-financial, non-
utility US companies with 20 years of data between 1998 and 2007. The general sample consists of 10391 non-
financial, non-utility US companies with at least five years of data between 1970 and 2008. Market leverage is the ratio 
of total debt to the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Book leverage is the ratio of total debt to the book 
value of assets. Assets are deflated using 2000 as the base year. MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets. Profitability is operating income scaled by book assets. Median industry leverage is the median 
market leverage for each three digit SIC industry. Earnings volatility is the rolling 10 year standard deviations of 
profitability. We require minimum three years of data to calculate earnings volatility. T bill is the return on 6 month T 
bill.  
 
  Survivor  General 
  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Market leverage 0.2239 0.1684  0.2746 0.2143 
Book leverage 0.2192 0.2084  0.2414 0.2197 
Assets 4782 388  1555 71 
Profitability 0.0782 0.0879  0.0361 0.0764 
MV/BV 1.6934 1.3974  1.7398 1.2801 
Tangibility 0.3032 0.2604  0.3174 0.2678 
Industry median leverage 0.1944 0.1785  0.2211 0.2017 
Earnings volatility 0.0608 0.0425  0.1032 0.0563 
Dividend 0.6249 1  0.4943 0 
T bill 0.0443 0.0482  0.0548 0.0524 
   
 
  Firm 894  10391 
N 17880  140120 
 
leverage is the ratio of total debt to the book value of assets. MV/BV is the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets. Profitability is operating income scaled by book assets. 
Median industry leverage is the median market leverage for each three digit SIC industry with 
more than three companies. Earnings volatility is the rolling 10 year standard deviation of 
profitability. We require a minimum of three years of operating income to calculate the earnings 
volatility variable. Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a firm pays dividend. 
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The six month T-bill, which is used as a proxy for expected inflation, is obtained from the Fed 
website. The Compustat definitions of the financial variables are provided in Appendix 2.1. 
 
5.  Evidence from the survivors sample 
 
5.1 Test of Slope Homogeneity 
For the explanation in Section 2 to be relevant, we need to determine whether slope 
heterogeneity is an appropriate assumption for the leverage models. For the Survivor sample, we 
check the appropriateness of the assumption using two different methods. First, we examine the 
variance of the firm-specific components      in equation (2). If the slope coefficients are 
heterogeneous across firms, the variances of      will be statistically different from zero. 
Specifically, we estimate the model in equations  (1) and (2) using a random coefficient model 
and then re-estimate the model under the restriction that       . Based on the log likelihood 
statistics, we can test whether the variances of     ’s are statistically different from zero.  
Second, we test the hypothesis of slope homogeneity, using the  ̃ test recently developed 
by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008). The  ̃ test explicitly tests the hypothesis of slope homogeneity. 
The test statistic is provided in Appendix 2.2.  
In Table 2.2, we present the results of the likelihood ratio test and the   ̃ test. Both tests 
suggest that the hypothesis of slope homogeneity can be rejected at p <0.0001. This is not 
surprising given the high degree of firm-specific heterogeneity in capital structure that has been 
documented in previous studies. In unreported analysis, we also drop or add capital structure 
determinants from the model one at a time and then test the hypothesis of slope homogeneity for 
the resulting models. The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases. Since the hypothesis of slope 
homogeneity is rejected, the explanation in Section 2 can at least partly explain Lemmon, Robert 
and Zender’s (2008) findings.  
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Table 2.2. Test of Slope Homogeneity 
 
The table reports the results of the likelihood ratio and the   ̃ tests in Section 5.1. The  tests are performed on the non-
financial, non-utility US companies with 20 years of data in Compustat between 1998 and 2007 to check whether the 
assumption of slope heterogeneity hold for the leverage model in equation (1). The dependent variable is market 
leverage. The regressors include size, profitability, MV/BV, tangibility, median industry leverage and inflation. The 
variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
 
    ∆ statistic p value 
Likelihood ratio test 12547.43           < 0.0001 
 ̃ test 50.4340 < 0.0001 
 
5.2 How important are the capital structure determinants? 
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) find that the fixed effect model can explain 
substantially more variation in leverage than the pooled OLS regressions. They argue that the 
majority of the variation in leverage is unexplained by previously identified determinants. 
However, due to the presence of “pseudo fixed effects”, the adjusted    statistics of the pooled 
OLS and fixed effect models provide misleading information about the relative importance of 
capital structure determinants. In this subsection, we assess whether firm-specific attributes have 
incremental explanatory power under the maintained assumption of slope heterogeneity. We 
compare both the in-sample and the out-of-sample performances of the models.  
 
5.2.1 Results from firm-specific regressions 
We estimate separate OLS regressions for each firm. The regressors include the six core 
capital structure determinants identified by Frank and Goyal (2009): firm size, profitability, 
MV/BV, tangibility, industry median leverage and expected inflation as proxied by the return on 
six month T bill. Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) use two other variables, earnings volatility 
and a dividend dummy. We do not include the dividend dummy because it is largely time 
invariant and thus can not be used in the firm-specific regressions. To calculate earnings volatility, 
we need at least three years of data on profitability. Since minimum data restrictions on 
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profitability further restrict our sample size, we choose not to include it in the model. We 
nevertheless consider these two variables when we analyze the general sample. 
The regression for each firm has six regressors and is estimated using twenty years of data. 
Because the sample size is small relative to the number of regressors, the estimation results are 
necessarily noisy. Despite this limitation, the firm-specific regression results provide a useful 
starting point because they do not utilize information in the cross-section and thus provide 
evidence about whether time series variation in the determinants of capital structure is important. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2.3. Panel A of  Table 2.3 presents the mean group 
estimates of the coefficients for the capital structure determinants (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). The 
mean group estimator involves estimating firm-specific regressions and then averaging the 
coefficients across firms. The coefficients have signs and significance levels that are consistent 
with previous research. Therefore, even though the results for individual firm-specific regressions 
tend to be noisy, the mean coefficients of the 894 firm-specific regressions suggest that the model 
captures much of the underlying factors that determine capital structure decisions. 
Panel B reports the distribution of adjusted    statistics of the firm-specific regressions. 
In standard fixed effects specifications, firm fixed effects can be loosely interpreted as firm-
specific intercepts. The adjusted    of the firm-specific regressions then measures the 
incremental explanatory power of the capital structure determinants beyond an intercept only 
model. For about 5% of the firms, the adjusted     is less than 0.0042. For these firms, capital 
structure determinants have little explanatory power beyond the intercepts. However, the 25 
percentile, the 50 percentile and the 75 percentile of the adjusted    statistics are respectively 
0.2896, 0.5196 and 0.6932. Therefore, for most firms, the capital structure determinants explain a 
significant proportion of the variation that is unexplained by firm-specific intercepts.  
Panel C evaluates the explanatory power of the capital structure determinants in the 
overall sample. The first column presents adjusted    for a model that only estimates firm 
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Table 2.3. Results from Separate OLS Regressions by Firm 
 
The table reports the estimation results of the firm-specific OLS regressions. The sample consists of the non-financial, non-utility US companies with 20 years of data between 
1988 and 2007. Size is measured as the log of book assets. MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Profitability is operating income scaled by 
book assets. Tangibility is net plant, property and equipment scaled by book assets. Industry median leverage is the median leverage for each three digit SIC industry. T bill is the 
return on six month T bill from the FED website.  Except for T bill, all regressors are lagged one year. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates of the mean group model. To 
calculate the mean group estimates, we fit OLS regressions of equation (1) for each firm in the sample. The mean coefficients of the firm-specific OLS regressions are then taken 
as the coefficients for the mean group model. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Panel B reports the distribution of the adjusted    statistics of the firm-specific OLS 
regressions. Panel C reports the adjusted    statistics of the model with only firm dummies, the LSDV model and the model with firm-specific slopes for each firm. a, b and c 
denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Panel A: Mean group estimates 
 
 
                            
  Intercept   Size   Profitability   MV/BV   Tangibility   
Industry 
median 
leverage   T bill   
Coef -0.1731 
a 
0.0505 
a 
-0.1951 
a 
-0.0311 
a 
0.1497 
a 
0.3831 
a      
0.4055 
a 
Stderr (0.0403)   (0.0053)   (0.0294)   (0.0046)   (0.0375)   (0.0333)   (0.0566)   
 
Panel B: Distribution of adjusted    of the firm-specific regressions 
 
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
0.0042 0.1126 0.2896 0.5196 0.6932 0.7948 0.8494 
 
 
Panel C: Adjusted    statistics of the model with only firm dummies, the LSDV model and the firm-specific regressions for the overall sample 
 
  Dummy Only LSDV Firm-Specific OLS 
Adjusted    0.5562 0.6205 0.8002 
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dummies. The second and third columns present the statistics, respectively, for the LSDV model 
and the firm-specific regressions. Because the models differ in the number of parameters, it is 
more appropriate to use adjusted   , rather than   , to evaluate model fit. The dummy only 
model an adjusted    of 0.5562. The adjusted    of the LSDV model is 0.6205, which is only  
0.064 higher than dummy only model. Since the adjusted    indicates a marginally better fit 
relative to the dummy only model, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the capital 
structure determinants are unimportant. However, as we show in equation (4), the effects of the 
capital structure determinants can be absorbed by firm fixed effects. The overall adjusted    of 
firm-specific regressions is 0.8002. Therefore, when slope heterogeneity is properly accounted for, 
the capital structure determinants have substantially more explanatory power than what is 
suggested by the LSDV model. 
Although the firm-specific regressions provide preliminary evidence about the 
importance of the capital structure determinants, there are two main concerns. First, the sample 
size is small relative to the number of regressors being estimated, the estimation results may not 
be stable. Second, firm-specific regressions ignore cross-sectional information. In response to 
these limitations, we examine whether more conclusive evidence can be obtained from the 
random coefficient/multilevel models, which utilize both time-series and cross-sectional 
information. 
 
5.2.2 Results from Random coefficient/multilevel models 
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results of the random coefficient/multilevel models. In 
Panel A, we compare the models estimated using the raw data. For the random 
coefficient/multilevel models, the table reports the average effects across firms, i.e., the  ̂  in 
equation (12). The firm-specific components are suppressed. The least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) model is used as the benchmark model. RCM I is a random coefficient model with  
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Table 2.4. Results from random coefficient models 
 
The table compares the results of the least square dummy variable (LSDV) model with those of the random 
coefficient/multilevel models. The sample consists of the non-financial, non-utility US companies with 20 years of data 
between 1988 and 2007. The dependent variable is market leverage. Size is measured as the log of book assets. MV/BV is 
the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Profitability is operating income scaled by book assets. 
Tangibility is net plant, property and equipment scaled by book assets. Industry median leverage is the median leverage for 
each two digit SIC industry. T bill is the return on six month T bill.  Panel A reports the models estimated using the raw 
data. The RCM I model has homogeneous intercept yet heterogeneous slopes. The RCM II model has both heterogeneous 
intercepts and heterogeneous slopes. The MLM model is the multilevel model in equations (16) – (17). Panel B reports the 
models estimated after subtracting the firm-specific means from the data. For both Panel A and Panel B, the columns for 
the random coefficient/multilevel models report the average effects (β
 
 in equation (2)). The firm-specific slopes are 
suppressed. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Panel A: Models using raw data 
  LSDV   RCM I   RCM II   MLM   
Intercept -0.1259 
a 
0.0135 
a 
0.0314 
a 
-0.0235 
a 
 
(0.0263) 
 
(0.0075) 
 
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0088) 
 
Size 0.0289 
a 
0.0204 
a 
0.0191 
a 
0.0386 
a 
 
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0016) 
 
(0.0051) 
 
Profitability -0.1926 
a 
-0.2069 
a 
-0.2185 
a 
-0.1565 
a 
 
(0.0098) 
 
(0.0164) 
 
(0.0156) 
 
(0.0747) 
 
MV/BV -0.0189 
a 
-0.0244 
a 
-0.0253 
a 
-0.0248 
a 
 
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0063) 
 
Tangibility 0.1626 
a 
0.0850 
a 
0.0810 
a 
0.3254 
a 
 
(0.0093) 
 
(0.0143) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0674) 
 
Industry median leverage 0.2936 
a 
0.3155 
a 
0.3046 
a 
0.7136 
a 
 
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0180) 
 
(0.0179) 
 
(0.0849) 
 
T bill 0.6232 
a 
0.3563 
a 
0.3363 
a 
1.0409 
a 
 
(0.0389) 
 
(0.0401) 
 
(0.0401) 
 
(0.2338) 
 
Size×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0008 
 
       
(0.0005) 
 
Size ×              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.0164 
 
       
(0.0159) 
 
Size ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.0042 
a 
       
(0.0015) 
 
Size ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0072 
 
       
(0.0060) 
 
Size ×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
0.0293 
b 
       
(0.0144) 
 
Profitability×    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
0.0080 
 
       
(0.0095) 
 
Profitability×            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.7390 
a 
       
(0.2277) 
 
Profitability ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
0.0433 
c 
       
(0.0244) 
 
Profitability ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0052 
 
       
(0.1010) 
 
Profitability ×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.6851 
a 
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(Table 2.4. cont’d) 
       
 
       
(0.2576) 
 
MV/BV×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0030 
a 
       
(0.0008) 
 
MV/BV×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
      
0.0609 
a 
       
(0.0180) 
 
MV/BV×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
0.0114 
a 
       
(0.0018) 
 
MV/BV×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0137 
 
       
(0.0098) 
 
MV/BV×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.1125 
a 
       
(0.0246) 
 
Tang×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0175 
b 
       
(0.0074) 
 
Tang ×              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.1193 
 
       
(0.2299) 
 
Tang ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.0525 
b 
       
(0.0233) 
 
Tang ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
0.0244 
 
       
(0.0803) 
 
Tang ×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
0.1481 
 
       
(0.2147) 
 
Indlev×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.0085 
 
       
(0.0090) 
 
Indlev ×              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.4735 
 
       
(0.3345) 
 
Indlev ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.1601 
a 
       
(0.0324) 
 
Indlev ×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
0.0546 
 
       
(0.0966) 
 
Indlev ×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.2719 
 
       
(0.2255) 
 
T bill×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.1068 
a 
       
(0.0265) 
 
Tbill ×              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
1.0626 
 
       
(0.8357) 
 
T bill×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
-0.0722 
 
       
(0.0812) 
 
T bill×     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
      
-0.8312 
a 
       
(0.2932) 
 
T bill×       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
      
3.0735 
a 
       
(0.7214) 
 
AIC  -30310 
 
-36580 
 
-37049 
 
-36107 
 
BIC  -30302 
 
-36474 
 
-36910 
 
-35823 
 
Adjusted    0.6192   0.7245   0.7163   0.7064   
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Panel B: Models using demeaned data 
          
  Fixed Effect  RCM III  
Intercept -0.0277 
 
-0.0233 
 
 
(0.0018) 
 
(0.0016) 
 Size 0.0289 
a 
0.0399 
a 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0033) 
 
Profitability -0.1925 
a 
-0.2177 
a 
 
(0.0096) 
 
(0.0189) 
 
MV/BV -0.0189 
a 
-0.0250 
a 
 
(0.0009) 
 
(0.0019) 
 
Tangibility 0.1627 
a 
0.1461 
a 
 
(0.0091) 
 
(0.0206) 
 
Industry median leverage 0.2937 
a 
0.3381 
a 
 
(0.0105) 
 
(0.0211) 
 
Inflation 0.6223 
a 
0.5233 
a 
 
(0.0378) 
 
(0.0342) 
 
     AIC (smaller is better) -35689 
 
-43276 
 BIC (smaller is better) -35682 
 
-43232 
 Adjusted R
2
 0.1420   0.4520   
 
heterogeneous slopes but homogenous intercept. RCM II is a random coefficient model with both 
heterogeneous intercepts and coefficients. Based on the information criteria and the adjusted     
statistics20, the models with heterogeneous slope coefficients outperform the LSDV model. The 
adjusted    for RCM I and RCM II are, respectively, 0.7245 and 0.7163. The information criteria 
for these two models are also quite similar. Therefore, when heterogeneous slopes are specified 
for the capital structure determinants, adding heterogeneous intercepts to the model only 
marginally improves the model fit. This is consistent with equation (4), which suggests that the 
firm-specific intercepts in the leverage models can capture the pseudo fixed effects.  
As mentioned in Section 3, a potential concern is that firm-specific slopes may be 
correlated with the regressors, rendering the estimators inconsistent (Mundlak, 1978, Hsiao, 
                                                          
20
 The adjusted    is calculated as   
∑       ̂    
 
∑       ̂    
 
   
     
, where  ̂    is the fitted value calculated using the best linear 
unbiased predictor  ̂ . We penalize the statistic for each firm-specific slope that is included in the model. 
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2003). We estimate the multilevel model (MLM) using equation (11) along with auxiliary 
equations for the coefficient vector    as a function of the ith firm’s observed explanatory 
variables. Specifically, the model can be written as 
                                                                           
                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                    
and the auxiliary equations are, for k = 1 to 6, 
             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅             
For convenience, the time scripts are suppressed in equation (16). In equation (17), bars denote 
the time-series means of the variables for each firm i. Substituting equation (17) into equation 
(16), we obtain a reduced form of the standard multlevel model, which includes the capital 
structure determinants and their interaction terms with     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ,            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and 
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  as explanatory variables. 
The last column in Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the estimation results for the MLM 
model. Some of the interaction terms have statistically significant coefficients, indicating that the 
firm-specific slopes are indeed related to the firm characteristics.  
The main purpose of this section is to compare model fit. Since we include these 
interaction terms simply to control for possible correlation between capital structure determinants 
and firm-specific slopes, we choose not to discuss the coefficients of the interaction terms. We 
provide a more detailed discussion of these interaction terms when we analyze the general sample. 
In terms of information criteria and the adjusted   ,  MLM is similar to the two random 
coefficient models. Therefore, after controlling the correlation between the firm-specific slopes 
and the regressors, the model with heterogeneous slopes still explains more variation in leverage 
than the LSDV model does, but has similar within-sample explanatory power relative to the RCM 
I and RCM II models.  
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 Rather than estimate firm-specific dummy variables, we estimate a standard fixed effect 
model using demeaned data as specified in equation (14). Panel B of Table 2.4 presents the 
models estimated using the demeaned data. We present the demeaned models in a different panel 
because the fit statistics of models using different data cannot be compared with each other. The 
model in the first column is an OLS model estimated using demeaned data, which is effectively a 
fixed effect model. RCM III is the random coefficient model in equation (14). Consistent with the 
results in Panel A, the random coefficient model outperforms the fixed effect model in terms of 
information criteria and adjusted   ,providing further evidence that the capital structure 
determinants explain substantially more variation in leverage than what is suggested by the fixed 
effect model. 
Given the large number of coefficients being estimated, the possibility of over-fitting is a 
potential concern. To address this, we compare the out-of-sample predictive performances of the 
different models. When over-fitting is a problem, the models exaggerate minor fluctuations in the 
data, leading to poor predictive performance. By contrast, the models that do the best job 
capturing the true economic relations are likely to perform better in out-of-sample predictive tests.   
We use the MSE (mean squared forecasting error) ratio to compare the out-of-sample 
performance of the models over the one year, five year and eight year horizons. For the one year 
horizon, we first estimate a model using the nineteen years of data before a particular year. Then 
we plug the values of the capital structure determinants in the twentieth year into the fitted model 
to predict the firms’ leverage. Specifically, we predict the leverage in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 
2007 using the models fitted with the data in 1983 – 2002, 1984 – 2003, 1985 – 2004, 1987 – 
2005 and 1988 - 2006. For the five year horizon, we estimate the model with data from 1988 – 
2002. The forecast period is 2003 – 2007. For the eight year horizon, the model is fitted with data 
from 1988 to 1999 and the forecast period is 2000 – 2007. Once the forecasts are obtained, we 
calculate the MSEs of the models.  
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Panel A of Table 2.5 reports the MSE ratios for the one year horizon. The models in the 
first four columns correspond to the models in Panel A of Table 2.4. The models in the last two 
columns correspond to the models in Panel B of Table 2.4. For the models estimated using raw  
Table 2.5. Out-of-Sample Prediction 
The table compares the out-of-sample predictive performances of the models. Panel A, B and C report the mean 
squared forecasting error (MSE) ratios for the one year, five year and eight year horizons. The first four columns report 
the MSEs for the models estimated using the raw data and the last two columns for the models estimated using 
demeaned data. The LSDV model is the least square dummy variable (LSDV) model. The RCM I model has 
homogeneous intercept and heterogeneous slopes. The RCM II model has both heterogeneous intercepts and 
heterogeneous slopes. The MLM model is the multilevel model in equations (16) – (17). The RCM model for 
demeaned data has heterogeneous slopes. For the one year horizon, the models are fitted using the data in the previous 
nineteen years. The values of the capital structure determinants in the 20th year are then plugged into the fitted models 
to obtain the predicted leverage. For the five year horizon, the model is fitted using data from 1988 to 2002. The fitted 
parameters are then used to predict the leverage from 2003 to 2007. For the eight year horizon, the model is fitted using 
data from 1988 to 1999. The fitted parameters are then used to predict the leverage from 2000 to 2007. Based on the 
predicted leverage, the MSE ratios (model MSE/benchmark MSE) are then calculated. For the models estimated using 
the raw (demeaned) data, the MSE of the LSDV (fixed effect) model is used as the benchmark MSE.  
 
Panel A: MSE ratio for one year horizon 
 
Raw Data  Demeaned Data 
Year LSDV RCM I RCM II MLM 
 
Fixed Effect RCM III 
2003 1 0.6514 0.6240 0.6577  1 0.6158 
2004 1 0.7008 0.7129 0.7083  1 0.7714 
2005 1 0.7802 0.7529 0.7859  1 0.7564 
2006 1 0.8270 0.7945 0.8322  1 0.7891 
2007 1 0.7181 0.7026 0.7194  1 0.7054 
 
Panel B: MSE ratio for five year horizon 
 
Raw Data 
 
Demeaned Data 
Year LSDV RCM I RCM II MLM  Fixed Effect RCM III 
2003 1 0.6505 0.6387 0.6523  1 0.5911 
2004 1 0.7986 0.8184 0.8116  1 0.7219 
2005 1 0.9003 0.9182 0.9146  1 0.7886 
2006 1 0.9904 1.0169 0.9999  1 0.8815 
2007 1 0.9519 0.9886 0.9402  1 0.8671 
 
Panel C: MSE ratio for the eight year horizon 
 
Raw Data 
 
Demeaned Data 
Year LSDV RCM I RCM II MLM  Fixed Effect RCM III 
2000 1 0.8542 0.8195 0.8197  1 0.9076 
2001 1 0.9114 0.8777 0.8582  1 0.8439 
2002 1 0.8810 0.8853 0.8446  1 0.6656 
2003 1 0.8913 0.9296 0.8715  1 0.6473 
2004 1 0.8927 0.9353 0.8999  1 0.6788 
2005 1 0.8714 0.8889 0.8934  1 0.7811 
2006 1 0.9454 0.9523 0.9616  1 0.9113 
2007 1 0.9354 0.9607 0.9228  1 0.8825 
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data, the MSE of the LSDV model is used as the benchmark MSE. For the models estimated 
using the demeaned data, the MSE of the fixed effect model is used as the benchmark MSE.  The 
models exhibit consistent predictive performance. For the raw data models, the three random 
coefficient/multilevel models consistently outperform the LSDV model. The MSEs of the random 
coefficient/multilevel models are about 25% - 28% smaller than the benchmark model. Moreover, 
the MSEs for RCM I and RCM II are similar. Therefore, when heterogeneous slopes are specified 
for the capital structure determinants, allowing heterogeneous intercepts adds little to the 
predictive performance. This is inconsistent with the view that the target leverage is time 
invariant. For the demeaned data models, RCM III consistently outperforms the fixed effect 
model. The average MSE reduction is about 28%. 
Panel B of Table 2.5 reports the MSE ratios for the five year horizon. As we mention in 
Section 2, firm-specific slopes are assumed to be invariant across time largely for modeling 
convenience. More realistically, we can view them as being stable, yet still slowly evolving time. 
As time elapses, the firm-specific slopes that are estimated during the estimation period become 
less accurate predictors for the firm-specific slopes during the forecast period. Thus, their 
advantage against the LSDV model will decrease over time. This appears to be true in Panel B. 
For the raw data, the random coefficient/multilevel models outperform the LSDV model in the 
first two – three years. For the demeaned data, the random coefficient model outperforms the 
fixed effect model in all five years, but their advantages get smaller over time. The results in 
Panel C also confirm the superior out-of-sample performances of the random 
coefficient/multilevel models over the eight year horizon. 
Since the random coefficient models outperform the benchmark models in out-of-sample 
prediction, it is unlikely that their superior in-sample fit is merely a statistical artifact. The results 
from Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 suggest that the random coefficient models capture the underlying 
economic relationship better than the benchmark models do.  
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6. Evidence from the general sample 
 
The results from the Survivor sample show that the capital structure determinants can 
explain substantially more variation in leverage when the models include proper controls for 
slope heterogeneity. This supports our view that slope heterogeneity can be a relevant explanation 
for the fixed effect puzzle documented by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). In this section, 
we examine the results from the general sample. In addition to providing further evidence of 
slope heterogeneity, we explore the potential sources of slope heterogeneity. Because many of the 
factors affecting firm-specific slopes are likely to be unobservable, we do not attempt to identify 
all sources of slope heterogeneity. Instead, we focus on the relation between slope heterogeneity 
and previously identified factors that are known to affect capital structure. The goal is to examine 
whether the differences in the firm-specific slopes are related to established economic factors.  
 
6.1 Slope heterogeneity and firm characteristics 
In this section, we examine the relation between slope heterogeneity and firm 
characteristics. We focus on five firm characteristics: firm size, profitability, MV/BV, tangibility 
and earnings volatility. There are several reasons why these variables could affect the firm-
specific slope    in equation (2). First and most importantly, these variables can be related to 
financial constraints. For example, Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that larger firms with low 
growth opportunities should find it relatively easy to raise external financing.  They classify firms 
into constrained and unconstrained groups based on firm size and MV/BV.  From a model 
selection perspective, they find that tangibility and firm size play a more important role in 
explaining leverage for low MV/BV firms.  Similar arguments can also be made for firms with 
more tangible assets and lower earnings volatilities as they are associated with less information 
asymmetry. Finally, profitability is a component in the Whited and Wu (2006) and Kaplan and 
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Zingales Indices (1996) of financial constraints. When firms face higher financial constraints, 
they can be less responsive to changes in capital structure determinants because of higher 
adjustment costs.  
Second, firms with larger size, higher profitability, more stable cash flows and fewer 
growth opportunities can be characterized as “cash cows”. Myers (2003) suggests that such firms 
face more pressure to follow the pecking order. Similar predictions can be made from the agency 
theory perspective because stable cash cows benefit more from the discipline of regular interest 
payments. The conditional applicability of the capital structure theories can affect the cross-
sectional differences in the firms’ sensitivities toward the changes in capital structure 
determinants.  For example, the conditional applicability of the pecking order theory suggests that 
firms with higher profitability or lower earnings volatility should follow the pecking order more 
closely and thus have more negative coefficient for profitability.  
Similar reasoning allows us to develop additional predictions. For example, firms with 
higher tangibility have more collateralizable assets and thus can borrow more for a given amount 
of variation in firm size. This suggests that firms with more tangible assets should have more 
positive coefficients for size relative to other firms.  
To examine how these variables affect the firms’ slope coefficients in the leverage 
models, we estimate the model in equations (18) and (19).  
     (       )          (       )            (       )
  
       
                            
                                                                                                  
For  k = 1 to 6, 
                          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅                 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                                                                                                     
Equation (18) includes the same capital structure determinants used in Lemmon, Roberts and 
Zender (2008). The   ′  are the average effect across firms.     ′  are the firm-specific slopes 
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for firm i. Equation (19) specifies the firm-specific slopes      for each of the capital determinants, 
except for the dividend dummy, as a function of the long term components of the firms’ size, 
profitability, MV/BV, tangibility and earnings volatility. We use firm-specific time series means 
as proxies for the long term components of these variables. For convenience, we will refer to the 
explanatory variables in equation (18) as capital structure determinants and those in equation (19) 
as slope determinants. In equation (19), firm size and MV/BV are scaled by the median of all 
NYSE companies that are in the Compustat for the same fiscal year. The scaling procedure is 
necessary because it controls for the possibility that inflation distorts the economic meaning of 
these variables. Moreover, even after controlling for inflation, time varying financial constraints 
still may result in estimates that reflect other time trends. For example, a firm that is valued at $10 
billion in an expanding economy may find it easier to borrow funds than the same firm, also 
valued at $10 billion, in a recession. 
We substitute equation (18) into equation (19) to obtain a reduced form version of the 
model. Due to space considerations, the details of the specification are presented in Appendix 2.3. 
Similar to our specification of the multilevel model in equations (16) and (17), the reduced form 
model contains the interaction terms between the capital structure determinants and the slope 
determinants.
21
  If the slope determinants affect firm-specific slopes, many of the interaction 
terms will be statistically significant, and there should be meaningful improvement in model fit 
after including the interaction terms. 
When there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity in equation (18) in addition to the 
slope heterogeneity specified in equation (19), the OLS estimation of equations (18) and (19) may 
be biased. To mitigate the effects of the unobserved heterogeneity, we also estimate a “fixed 
effect” version of the model by subtracting the firm-specific means from the variables in equation 
(18). The reduced form version of this model is specified as: 
                                                          
21
 Fama and French (2002) use similar interaction terms to accommodate the variation of adjustment speeds across 
firms. 
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 ̈    (       )    ̈       (       )      ̈                     ̈                           ̈       
                      ̈                            ̈                  ̈                         
where    ̈  denotes the deviation of variable x from its time series mean. We then estimate a 
reduced form of the model based on equations (19) and (20). 
Estimation results are presented in Table 2.6. Panels A and B respectively report OLS 
estimation results for the reduced form models based on equations (18) and (19) and the “fixed 
effect” estimation results for equations (19) and (20). Given the large amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity that likely exists in leverage models, we consider the “fixed effect” estimation 
results to be more reliable. We present the OLS estimation results mainly to show the incremental 
improvement in adjusted   .  
In Panel A of Table 2.6, Model I is an OLS model with the traditional capital structure 
determinants and year fixed effects. It is the base model for evaluating Model II, which is the 
“fixed effects” model as specified by equations (19) and (20). We present the interaction terms in 
Model II in separate columns. For example, the column              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ presents the interaction 
terms between            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and the variables in the rows. Many of the interaction terms are 
statistically significant, supporting the view that the cross-sectional differences in the firms’ slope 
coefficients relate to the variables in the column. Moreover, the adjusted    is 0.3134 for the base 
model and 0.3939 for model II. Thus, allowing the firms’ slopes to differ by the five slope 
determinants leads to meaningful improvements in model fit. The results in Panel A provide 
further evidence that part of the unobserved heterogeneity in the leverage models is related to the 
cross-sectional differences in slope coefficients and that the differences in slope coefficients are 
related to economically meaningful factors. 
By way of comparison, almost all of the statistically significant OLS coefficients in Panel 
A remain significant and retain consistent signs in Panel B. However, some of the coefficient 
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estimates for earnings volatility are no longer significant in the fixed effects model
22
.  The 
interaction term between size and        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  change signs and that between industry median 
leverage and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  turns insignificant. 
Given the substantial amount of unobserved heterogeneity that is known to exist in the 
leverage models, the “fixed effect” estimation in Panel B is more reliable. We will thus 
concentrate our discussion on Model II in Panel B. The interaction terms 
involving           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅,            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  are broadly consistent with the view 
that financial constraints cause firms to be less responsive to changes in the capitals structure 
determinants. Take firms with higher            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ for example. Consistent with Frank and 
Goyal (2009), we find that these firms are less responsive to the changes in size and tangibility. 
Moreover, the coefficients for profitability and MV/BV are less negative and the coefficient for 
industry median leverage is less positive. In other words, firms with relatively high growth 
opportunities are less sensitive to the changes in most of the capital structure determinants in the 
column. The firms with lower tangibility and higher earnings volatility may also face higher 
financial constraints due to greater information asymmetry. The results in Panel B show that these 
firms tend to be less sensitive to the changes in firm size, profitability, MV/BV and industry 
median leverage. Alternative explanations are possible for some of the interaction terms. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, the positive interaction between             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and profitability is 
consistent with the pecking order or agency theory perspectives. Taken as a whole, the results 
regarding            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ ,            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   suggest that financial constraints 
play an important role in determining cross-sectional differences in slopes. 
The results regarding the interaction terms involving        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  are consistent with the 
argument that more profitable firms face more pressure to follow the pecking order (Meyers, 
                                                          
22
 The lack of significance of the earnings volatility variable may be due to the fact it is estimated on a rolling horizon 
basis, resulting in an estimate that is quite stable over time. Since most of the components are common, there will not 
be as much time series variation in the variable as the others included in equation (20). 
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Table 2.6. Regression models that allow slopes to vary with firm characteristics 
 
This table presents the regression results of the models that allow slopes to vary with firm characteristics. The dependent variable is market leverage. The capital structure 
determinants are as defined in Section 4. The slope determinants are the firm-specific means of scaled size, profitability, scaled MV/BV, tangibility and earnings volatility. Scaled 
size and scaled MV/BV are, respectively, log(assets t-1) and MV/BV scaled by the median of all NYSE companies in Compustat in the same fiscal year. Panel A presents the 
results for the OLS estimation of the model in equations (18) and (19). Panel B presents the results for the “fixed effect” estimation of the model in equations (19) and (20). The 
standard errors in the parentheses are clustered by firm. Year fixed effects are included.  a, b, and c denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Panel A: Estimation results for the model in equations (18) and (19) 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
   
Own effect 
 
 
Interaction effects 
 
                      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Intercept 0.2268 
a
 0.0854 
a
 
          
 
(0.0074) 
 
(0.0102) 
           Size 0.0133 
a
 0.0587 
a
 -0.0119 
a
 0.0127 
a
 -0.0108 
a
 0.0147 
a
 -0.0069 
 
 
(0.0009) 
 
(0.0028) 
 
(0.0017) 
 
(0.0040) 
 
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0028) 
 
(0.0046) 
 Profitability -0.1919 
a
 -0.1667 
a
 -0.3042 
a
 -0.2274 
a
 0.0566 
a
 -0.0710 
a
 0.0885 
a
 
 
(0.0063) 
 
(0.0207) 
 
(0.0259) 
 
(0.0258) 
 
(0.0059) 
 
(0.0274) 
 
(0.0238) 
 MV/BV -0.0453 
a
 -0.0545 
a
 -0.0048 
b
 0.0008 
 
0.0139 
a
 -0.0147 
a
 0.0160 
a
 
 
(0.0008) 
 
(0.0027) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0030) 
 
(0.0026) 
 Tangibility 0.0671 
a
 0.3464 
a
 -0.1459 
a
 0.0428 
 
-0.0445 
a
 -0.1847 
a
 -0.0323 
 
 
(0.0070) 
 
(0.0276) 
 
(0.0219) 
 
(0.0416) 
 
(0.0092) 
 
(0.0269) 
 
(0.0438) 
 Earnings volatility -0.0593 
a
 0.0392 
 
-0.1465 
a
 0.0100 
 
-0.0024 
 
0.0135 
 
0.0483 
a
 
 
(0.0079) 
 
(0.0320) 
 
(0.0455) 
 
(0.0314) 
 
(0.0072) 
 
(0.0351) 
 
(0.0152) 
 Industry median leverage 0.5589 
a
 1.0130 
a
 -0.0182 
a
 -1.4450 
a
 -0.3181 
a
 -0.0522 
 
-0.4915 
a
 
 
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0329) 
 
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0953) 
 
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0394) 
 
(0.1128) 
 Dividend dummy -0.0469 
a
 -0.0374 
a
 
          
 
0.0031  
 
(0.0030) 
           Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
           N 140120 
 
140093 
Adjusted    0.3104   0.3939 
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Table 2.6. (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Estimation results for the model in equations (19) and (20)  
  
 
Model I 
   
 
Model II 
 
   
Own effect 
 
 
Interaction effects 
 
                      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅               ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Intercept 0.0666 
a 
0.0696 
a 
          
 
(0.0032) 
 
(0.0032) 
           Size 0.0262 
a 
0.0443 
a 
-0.0142 
a 
-0.0654 
a 
-0.0067 
a 
0.0137 
b 
-0.0158 
c 
 
(0.0012) 
 
(0.0043) 
 
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0097) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0057) 
 
(0.0092) 
 
Profitability -0.1415 
a 
-0.0815 
a 
-0.3101 
a 
-0.1343 
a 
0.0302 
a 
-0.1296 
a 
0.1045 a 
 
(0.0056) 
 
(0.0196) 
 
(0.0248) 
 
(0.0293) 
 
(0.0059) 
 
(0.0279) 
 
(0.0251) 
 
MV/BV -0.0222 
a 
-0.0353 
a 
-0.0139 
a 
-0.0006 
 
0.0112 
a 
-0.0270 
a 
0.0071 a 
 
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0024) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0030) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0033) 
 
(0.0027) 
 
Tangibility 0.1715 
a 
0.4749 
a 
-0.1831 
a 
-0.0387 
a 
-0.0935 
a 
-0.1434 
a 
-0.0759 
 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0369) 
 
(0.0323) 
 
(0.0051) 
 
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0504) 
 
(0.0556) 
 
Earnings volatility 0.0035 
 
-0.0098 
 
-0.0012 
 
0.1058 
c 
0.0170 
 
-0.0337 
 
0.0023 
 
 
(0.0109) 
 
(0.0411) 
 
(0.0613) 
 
(0.0583) 
 
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0412) 
 
(0.0255) 
 
Industry median 
leverage -0.0104 
a 
0.5667 
a 
0.0047 
 
-0.3015 
a 
-0.1762 
a 
-0.0411 
 
-0.3104 b 
 
(0.0029) 
 
(0.0344) 
 
(0.0046) 
 
(0.1125) 
 
(0.0172) 
 
(0.0426) 
 
(0.1305) 
 
Dividend dummy 0.3878 
a 
-0.0058 
b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0107  
 
(0.0028) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 140120 
 
140093 
Adjusted    0.1506   0.1849 
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2003). Firms with higher       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  have a more negative coefficient for profitability and are thus 
more sensitive to internal cash flows. In addition, they appear to be less sensitive to the changes 
in size, tangibility, earnings volatility and industry median leverage, all of which capture the costs 
and benefits considerations in the traditional tradeoff model. According to Frank and Goyal 
(2009), the tradeoff theory predicts positive coefficients for size and tangibility, yet the pecking 
order theory predicts negative coefficients for these two variables. The observation that firms 
with higher       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  have less positive signs for size and tangibility may simply reflect the 
offsetting effects of firms’ following a pecking order when raising external capital. 
The interpretation for the interaction terms involving            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  is less obvious. 
Consistent with the financial constraint interpretation, larger firms are more responsive to the 
changes in profitability and MV/BV. However, they also are less sensitive to the changes in size 
and tangibility. One possible explanation is that the negative signs for the interactions with size 
and tangibility reflect diminishing marginal effects of collateral values. 
The particular set of variables we examine suggest two possible reasons why firms have 
heterogeneous slopes in the leverage models. First, firms with different levels of financial 
constraints can have different sensitivities toward the changes in the capital structure 
determinants. Second, capital structure theories are conditional theories, each applicable to a 
particular set of firms. Either reason can explain why firms may have different sensitivities 
toward changes in capital structure determinants.  
Other possible explanations may also exist. Given that most of the competing capital 
structure theories are not mutually exclusive, it is a challenging task to rule out alternative 
explanations and provide a single definitive explanation for each of the interaction terms in Table 
2.6. For the purpose of this paper, the most important implication of the results in Table 2.6 is that 
cross-sectional differences in slopes are related to economically meaningful factors and can 
possibly be explained with existing theories. Moreover, the results in Table 2.6 show that 
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allowing the slopes to vary with these economically meaningful factors can lead to meaningful 
improvements in adjusted   . This is consistent with the view that slope heterogeneity can be a 
relevant explanation for the fixed effect puzzle documented by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 
(2008). 
 
6.2 Slope heterogeneity by industry 
Firms in the same industry are likely to make similar capital structure choices because 
similar productive opportunities create incentives to adopt similar accounting practices and 
respond to the changes in the capital structure determinants in similar ways. If firm-specific 
slopes are related to industry factors, we expect to observe substantial differences in 
responsiveness to different capital structure determinants across industries. To examine the slope 
heterogeneity across industries, we estimate OLS and firm fixed effect leverage models 
separately for each industry. The explanatory variables include size, profitability, MV/BV, 
tangibility, earnings volatility and dividend dummy. Because the regressions are run for each 
industry, industry median leverage is not included in the model. The data are from the general 
sample. Industries with less than 200 observations are excluded. Firms with three digit SIC code 
999 (nonclassifiable establishments) are also excluded.  
The distribution of the estimated coefficients is presented in Table 2.7. For conciseness, 
only the results of the firm fixed effect models are presented. By controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the fixed effect model produces more reliable estimates of the average effect 
within each industry. To be conservative, we focus on the distribution of coefficient estimates 
above the 20% percentile and below the 80% in our discussion. Even though this approach filters 
out a number of outliers, the differences within the 20%-80% range are still striking.
23
  Take the 
coefficient for profitability for example. The coefficient is -0.1525 at the 80% percentile, -0.3487 
at the 50% percentile and -0.6161 at the 20% percentile. Thus the capital structures of industries 
                                                          
23
 Qualitatively similar results are obtained using all coefficient estimates. 
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at the 20% percentile are almost four times more sensitive to profitability than those at the 80% 
percentile. The distribution in the Table 2.7 suggests that the assumption of homogeneous slopes 
is extremely unrealistic for the leverage models. 
Using the same sample, we estimate a number of nested leverage models where the 
coefficients are interacted with industries dummies and/or firm characteristics. If the industry 
factors and firm characteristics are important sources of slope heterogeneity, these models will 
Table 2.7. Slope Heterogeneity by industry 
 
This table presents the distribution of the industry-specific slopes. The data are from the general sample described in 
Section 4. Industries with less than 200 observations are excluded. Firms with three digit SIC code 999 (nonclassifiable 
establishments) are also excluded. Separate firm fixed effect regressions are run for each three digit SIC industry. The 
dependent variable is market leverage. The explanatory variables include size, profitability, MV/BV, tangibility, 
earnings volatility and dividend dummy, as defined in Section 4.  
 
                
  20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
Dividend dummy -0.0549 -0.0426 -0.0297 -0.0181 -0.0069 0.0053 0.0176 
Size 0.0298 0.0374 0.0471 0.0597 0.0684 0.0773 0.0923 
MV/BV -0.0529 -0.0459 -0.0394 -0.0334 -0.0277 -0.0198 -0.0139 
Profitability -0.6161 -0.4732 -0.3892 -0.3487 -0.2714 -0.2190 -0.1525 
Earnings volatility -0.4032 -0.2315 -0.1030 0.0329 0.1288 0.2279 0.3733 
Tangibility -0.0321 0.0280 0.0888 0.1511 0.1827 0.2215 0.2909 
 
have significant improvements in model fit.  The adjusted    of the models, which penalize the 
inclusion of additional variables, are presented in Table 2.8. 
Model I is a regression of market leverage on size, profitability, MV/BV, tangibility, 
earnings volatility, dividend dummy and year fixed effects. Notice there is no control for industry 
effects in Model I. Its adjusted   , 0.2307, is used as the benchmark for evaluating the 
explanatory powers of the industry factors and firm characteristics.  Model II is similar to the 
model in Table 2.6. It includes the capital structure determinants in Model I and their interaction 
terms with the slope determinants            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ,              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅,              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and  
            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ . After these interaction terms are included, the adjusted  
  improves to 0.3302. 
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Models III, IV, and V evaluate the explanatory power of industry effects. Model III 
includes the capital structure determinants in Model I and three-digit SIC industry dummies. 
Model IV includes the capital structure determinants in Model I and their interaction terms with 
industry dummies, effectively allowing the slopes to vary by industry. It thus has industry-
specific slopes, but not industry-specific intercepts. Model V includes the industry dummies, the 
capital structure determinants in Model I and their interaction terms with industry dummies. It 
thus has both industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific slopes. While the models appear 
to be complicated with the presence of the interaction terms, they are more parsimonious than the 
Table 2.8. Industry, Firm characteristics and the Explanatory Powers of Models 
 
This table presents the adjusted    for different models. Model I is OLS regression of market leverage on size, 
profitability, MV/BV, tangibility, earnings volatility and dividend dummy, as defined in Section 4. Model II allows the 
slopes of the variables in Model I to vary with the slope determinants            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ,            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 
           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Model III includes Model I variables and industry dummies. Model IV allows slopes 
to vary by industry. Model V includes both industry-specific intercepts and industry-specific slopes. Model VI includes 
industry-specific intercepts and allows slopes to vary both by industry and by slope determinants. 
 
  
Adjusted 
   
    
Model I  
(base model) 0.2307 
  Model II  
(base model + interaction terms between capital structure determinants and slope 
determinants ) 0.3302 
  Model III 
(base model + industry dummies) 0.3074 
  Model IV 
(Base model + interaction terms between capital structure determinants and industry 
dummies) 0.3505 
  Model V 
(Base model + industry dummies  
+ interaction terms between capital structure determinants and industry dummies) 0.3608 
  Model VI 
(Base model + interaction terms between capital structure determinants and slope 
determinants + industry dummies + interaction terms between capital structure determinants 
and industry dummies) 0.4176 
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popular LSDV model. If the LSDV model is estimated using this sample, the model would 
include 9649 firm dummies.  
The adjusted    for Model III is 0.3074. The statistic is 0.3505 for Model IV and 0.3608 
for Model V. Thus the adjusted   of Model V is 0.0103 higher than Model IV, yet 0.0534 higher 
than Model II. This indicates that the industry-specific slopes contain substantial information 
beyond the industry-specific intercepts. Yet, adding industry-specific intercepts adds remarkably 
little to the model fit once account is taken of the slope heterogeneity across industries. A 
comparison of model fit for the three models indicates that firms in the same industry share 
similarities in their capital structure decisions. However, such similarities are reflected not so 
much by a specific level of leverage that the industry is associated with as by the way the firms in 
the industry respond to the changes in capital structure determinants.       
Model VI includes the industry dummies and allows the slopes to vary with both the 
industry dummies and the slope determinants. It has an adjusted    of 0.4176, almost twice larger 
than the base model. The results in Table 2.8 show that meaningful improvements in model fit 
can be achieved if the slopes of the capital structure determinants are allowed to vary with 
industry and firm characteristics. This provides further evidence that the slope heterogeneity in 
the leverage models are related to industry factors and firm characteristics. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we explore the issues related to the firm-specific heterogeneity in leverage 
models. The unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled either by heterogeneous intercepts or by 
heterogeneous slopes. The heterogeneous slopes assumption implies that different firms respond 
differently to the changes in capital structure determinants. The heterogeneous intercepts are 
often interpreted as implying that firms are associated with firm-specific leverage levels that 
remain stable over a long period. The appropriateness of the assumptions depends on the 
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underlying data generating process. We show that the LSDV and fixed effect models can produce 
“pseudo fixed effects” when they are used to estimate data generating processes that are 
characterized with heterogeneous slopes. The “pseudo fixed effects” are the mechanical effects 
caused by the neglect of slope heterogeneity. Their presence should not be interpreted as evidence 
of time invariant leverage targets or evidence that the previous identified determinants are 
unimportant. 
We apply various heterogeneous panel methods to the Survivor sample. Using the   ̃ test 
recently developed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), we formally test and reject the assumption 
of slope homogeneity. To make more reliable assessment about the importance of the previously 
identified determinants, we estimate the leverage equations using random coefficient/multilevel 
models. We find the previously identified determinants can explain more variation in leverage 
than what is suggested by the OLS or fixed effect models. Moreover, when heterogeneous slopes 
are specified for the capital structure determinants, adding heterogeneous intercepts to the model 
only marginally improves the model fit. To address the concern about over-fitting, we compare 
the out-of-sample predictive performances of the models. We find the random 
coefficient/multilevel models have substantially smaller MSE than the LSDV and fixed effect 
models. These results suggest that the firm-specific heterogeneity is reflected more by 
heterogeneous slopes than by heterogeneous intercepts.  
Then we examine the slope heterogeneity in a more general sample. We find the slope 
heterogeneity in leverage models are related to industry factors and firm characteristics.  This 
suggests that the cross-sectional differences in slopes are not merely a statistical artifact. They are 
driven by economically meaningful factors. Our evidence indicates that financial constraints can 
play a role in determining the slope heterogeneity across firms. In addition, we find that the cross-
sectional differences in slopes can reflect the conditional applicability of capital structure theories, 
as suggested by Myers (2003). 
 Overall, the evidence in this paper leads to the following conclusions. First, it is more 
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appropriate to view firms as having heterogeneous responses to the changes in capital structure 
determinants than to view them as being associated with firm-specific, time invariant levels of 
debt ratios. Second, a substantial proportion of the fixed effects in leverage models are “pseudo 
fixed effects”. They cannot be used as evidence for time invariant leverage targets. Third, the 
previously identified determinants can explain substantially more variation in leverage than what 
is suggested by the fixed effect model. 
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Appendix 2.1. Variable definitions 
This appendix provides details about how the variables are constructed from Compustat data. 
Total Debt = Short Term Debt (DLC) + Long Term Debt (DLTT) 
Market Equity = Stock Price (PRCC_f) * Shares Outstanding (CSHO) 
Market Leverage = Total Debt/(Total Debt + Market Equity) 
Book Leverage = Total Debt/Total Assets (AT) 
Firm Size = Log(Total Assets adjusted for inflation) 
Profitability = Operating Income after Depreciation (OIADP)/Total Assets (AT)  
MV/BV = (Market Equity + Total Debt + Preferred Stock Liquidating Value (PSTKL) – 
Deferred Tax and Investment Tax Credits (TXDITC))/Total Assets (AT) 
Tangibility = Net PPE (PPENT)/Total Assets (AT) 
Earnings Volatility = Rolling 10 Year Standard Deviations of Profitability (minimum three 
years of data are required for calculating the variable) 
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Appendix 2.2.  ̃ test  
The  ̃ test can be used to test the hypothesis of slope homogeneity. The test statistic is 
 ̃ √ (
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√  
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In equations (1) – (4), k is the number of regressors and  τ  equals 
    τ (τ 
′
τ
 
)
  
τ
 
′
. Intuitively, equations (3) and (4) construct a weighted FE pooled 
estimator of slope coefficients.  ̃ in equation (2) measures the deviations of individual slopes 
from the weighted FE estimator. Equation (1) uses  ̃  to calculate a standardized dispersion 
statistic. Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) show that for static models with non-normal error terms, 
the test statistic follows a standard normal distribution if √       as (     ∞ . With 
normally distributed errors, the distribution of test statistic is standard normal regardless of the 
expansion rates of N and T.   
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Appendix 2.3. Reduced form model of Equations (18) and (19)   
                                                                                  
                                                              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅               
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅                           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                 
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅                             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅                            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅
                                 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅                                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                             ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅
                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
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CHAPTER III 
 
SIZE AND BOOK-TO-MARKET BASED RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The relative performance evaluation of chief executive officers is a matter of much study 
and debate. According to principal-agency theory, firms can contract more efficiently with CEOs 
by evaluating their performance relative to a group of peer companies. However, the empirical 
literature provides limited support for the relative performance evaluation model. Except for the 
early study by Gibbons and Murphy (1990), previous research finds little evidence for the use of 
relative performance evaluation in deciding CEO compensation (e.g., Antle and Smith (1986), 
Barro and Barro (1990), Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992), and Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999)). These studies focus on whether CEOs are rewarded on the basis of relative industry 
performance
24
. Little attention is given to the relative performance evaluation against other 
reference groups, such as companies with similar size or market-to-book ratios. In this paper, I 
examine whether boards of directors evaluate CEOs’ performances relative to their size and 
book-to-market peer groups.  
There are two advantages of using size and book-to-market peer groups for testing the 
relative performance evaluation model. First, while there is substantial stock return co-movement 
among firms in the same industry, industry is not a widely accepted asset pricing factor as the size 
and book-to-market factors are. Fama and French (1994) model industry stock performances 
using their three factor model, which includes the size factor (SMB) and book-to-market factor 
(HML) as explanatory variables. To the extent that the size and book-to-market effects underlie 
                                                          
24
 Bizjak, Lemon and Naveen (2008)  and Faulkender and Yang (2010) study the competitive benchmarking peers 
disclosed by companies. However, they focus on how these disclosed peers are used to extract rent or to determine 
competitive pay levels for retaining executives rather than on relative performance evaluation.  
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industry stock price movements, size and book-to-market peer groups may serve as better proxies 
for the common performance shocks. Second, strategic interactions may exist among firms in the 
same industry, offsetting the effects of relative performance evaluation. For example, Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) point out that the need to soften product market competition may cause 
boards to reward, rather than penalize, CEOs for the good performance of industry peers. Such 
product market competition is less a concern when the stock returns on size and book-to-market 
peer groups are used as proxies for testing the relative performance evaluation model. 
I find that boards pay CEOs less (more) when their size and book-to-market peers 
perform well (poorly). This is consistent with the predictions of the relative performance 
evaluation model. I also find a negative relation between CEO cash compensation and the 
adjusted returns of the firms’ size peer groups. I then examine whether my findings are driven by 
managerial entrenchment: entrenched managers may also seek to be evaluated against their size 
and book-to-market peers, but only when it is to their benefit to do so. In other words, they may 
seek to be evaluated only when their peer companies perform poorly. I find the negative relation 
between total compensation exists both in situations where the peer groups perform poorly and in 
situations where the peer groups perform well. My findings thus cannot be explained by 
managerial entrenchment. My main results are robust to the inclusion of various control variables 
and alternative proxies for peer group performances.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. 
Section 3 provides the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the main results of the 
paper. Section 5 reports the results of my robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
According to the principal agent model, boards can align CEOs’ interests with 
shareholders’ by linking CEO compensation to firm performance. In this context, boards reward 
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CEOs for unobserved effort by making inferences from firm performance. When some 
performance can also be attributed to factors beyond CEO control, such as industry wide shocks, 
firm performance is not sufficient to identify CEO effort. Risk averse CEOs will require higher 
compensation and/or exert suboptimal levels of effort if exogenous factors influence 
compensation. The relative performance evaluation model predicts that a well designed contract 
for risk averse CEOs filter common risks by benchmarking performance relative to appropriately 
chosen peer groups. Formally, suppose there are n CEOs and the i-th CEO’s output is 
                                                                                                                                    
where ai is the i-th CEO’s effort,  εi the idiosyncratic noise and θ a common shock. Under the 
assumption that εi’s are independently and identically distributed, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) 
suggest that   can be estimated as 
    ̅   ̅                                                                                                                                    
where   ̅ is the average output and  ̅ the average effort. Holmstrom (1982) shows that, under 
weak assumptions, the optimal compensation contract for the i-th CEO is a function of yi and  ̅. 
Consistent with the predictions of the relative performance evaluation model, Gibbons 
and Murphy (1999) find that the growth in CEO cash compensation is negatively and 
significantly related to industry performance, as measured by the stock returns of firms in the 
same sector
25
. Other studies are not successful in finding support for the relative performance 
evaluation model. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that relative performance 
evaluation does not appear to be an important source of managerial incentive. Antle and Smith 
(1986) decompose firm performance into industry and firm specific components and find that the 
industry component is positively related to the CEO compensation. This is inconsistent with the 
prediction that boards filter industry wide shocks. Barro and Barro (1990), Janakiraman, Lambert, 
                                                          
25 Gibbons and Murphy (1999) use 1-digit SIC code to identify sectors. When they extend their analysis to 2- and 3- 
digit SIC industries, they find no evidence that CEO compensation is negatively related to industry returns. 
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and Larcker (1992), and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) all document a positive relation between 
CEO compensation and industry performance. 
It has been argued that the paucity of evidence in support of the relative performance 
evaluation model could be partly attributed to the strategic interactions among firms.  Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) articulate the view that CEOs will take actions to reduce industry returns if 
they are penalized for good industry performance. They show that the need to soften product 
market competition can generate an optimal compensation contract that rewards the CEO for both 
own and rival performances. Since previous studies on relative performance evaluation focus on 
industry peers, their results are potentially affected by the strategic interactions among firms in 
the same industry. In this paper, I examine whether boards, in deciding CEO compensation, filter 
the common shocks that are reflected in peer groups that are formed based on size and book-to-
market ratios. My approach is less affected by product market competition because peer groups 
are formed by size and book-to-market ratio, rather than by industry. 
My motivation for using size and book-to-market peer groups is based on the importance 
these factors have in explaining variation in cross-sectional returns. Fama and French (1992) find 
that size and book-to-market ratio are related to firms’ stock performance. Their 1995 paper 
documents the size and book-to-market effects in earnings. Researchers have offered several 
economic interpretations for these two empirically identified factors. For example, Fama and 
French (1996) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) argue that size and book-to-market effects are 
related to financial distress. Several other studies relates the size and book-to-market effects to 
future investment opportunities and/or the riskiness of asset-in-place (Fama and French (1993), 
Petkova (2006), Gomes, Kogan and Zhang (2003), Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004)).  
To test the relative performance evaluation model, I follow Fama and French’s (1993) 
argument that size and book-to-market effects proxy for sensitivity to common risk factors. The 
question of whether the differences in sensitivities between large and small firms and between 
low and high book-to-market firms are driven by the differences in default risk, growth 
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opportunity or other factors, such as operating leverage, is less important for the purpose of my 
study. Under this theoretical framework, companies with similar size or book-to-market ratios 
have similar degrees of sensitivities to common risk factors. Under this assumption, equation (1) 
becomes 
                                                                                                                                (3) 
where     is the sensitivity of companies in size or book-to-market group j to common risk  . 
When the output is as specified in equation (3), simply averaging across firms cannot isolate the 
impact of common shock  , but produces estimate of    ̅̅ ̅̅ . By averaging within peer groups,     
can be more precisely estimated as 
       ̅    ̅                                                                                                                                       
where   ̅ is the average output of companies in group j and   ̅ the expected effort of CEOs in 
group j. In other words, the board can obtain more precise estimate of the impact of the common 
risk by evaluating the CEO relative to his peers in the same size or book-to-market group. 
Equations (3) and (4) assume that the stock prices of firms with different size and book-
to-market ratios respond differently to a single aggregate shock. This is consistent with the 
theoretical models in Gomes, Kogan and Zhang (2003) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 
(2004). Empirically,  Petkova (2006) finds that the SMB and HML factors (i.e., the stock return 
spread between small and large firms and that between the low and high book-to-market firms) 
are correlated with innovations in various macroeconomic factors, such as aggregate dividend 
yield, term spread, default spread and one-month T-bill rate. This suggests that the stock price 
effects of the shocks to these macroeconomic factors differ systematically by size and book-to-
market ratio, as equations (3) and (4) imply. 
The discussion above suggests that the stock returns of firms with similar size and book-
to-market ratios contain important information about common shocks. According to the relative 
performance evaluation model, boards can improve the efficiency of CEO compensation 
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contracts by, explicitly or implicitly, evaluating performance relative to their size and book-to-
market peers groups. If boards indeed filter common shocks related to size and book-to-market 
effects, there will be a negative relation between CEO compensation and the performance of their 
size and book-to-market peers. This leads to the main hypothesis of this paper, which is stated as 
follows: 
H1: CEO compensation is negatively related to the performances of companies with 
similar size and/or book-to-market ratios. 
To test this hypothesis, I build size and book-to-market peer groups for each company in 
my sample.  I regress measures of executive compensation on own stock return and peer group 
returns. If the board filters common risk factors, CEO compensation will be negatively and 
significantly related to peer group returns. 
The relative performance evaluation model predicts that boards filter common shocks 
both in situations where peer groups perform well and in situations where peer groups perform 
poorly. However, if entrenched CEOs can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to 
be evaluated relative to peer groups only when it is to their benefit to do so. One possibility is that 
they will seek to be evaluated relative to their size and/or book-to-market peer groups when peer 
groups perform poorly, but not when peer groups perform well. This leads to the second 
hypothesis of this paper, which is stated as follows. 
H2: CEO compensation is less negatively related to the performance of the firm’s size 
and book-to-market peers when the peers perform well than when they perform poorly. 
 
3. Data 
 
The initial sample consists of all CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total 
compensation information during the period 1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. This 
covers more than the whole universe of the S&P 1500 companies. I obtain stock returns from the 
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CRSP monthly stock return database. To be included in the sample, an observation should have 
twelve months of stock returns before a fiscal year end. I then match the sample to the accounting 
information from Compustat. I require that a sample observation has the lagged book equity 
information for calculating book-to-market ratio. Over the entire sample period, there are more 
than 3000 cases of CEO turnovers. At CEO turnover years, the lagged firm performances reflect 
the departing CEOs’ performances rather than the succeeding CEOs’ performances. I therefore 
delete observations for a CEO’s first year of service for a company. The resulting sample consists 
of 21,794 CEO-firm-year observations. Depending on the availability of the control variables 
used, the sample is smaller when some of the regression models are estimated. 
For each CEO-firm-year observation, I form size and book-to-market peer groups. The 
size peer groups are constructed from the companies listed in the Execucomp database for the 
same fiscal year. I calculate the size of a sample firm as its market value of equity at the 
beginning of the previous fiscal year. I then calculate the market values of other Execucomp 
companies as of the same calendar month. Based on their market values, I divide the companies 
into deciles using NYSE size breakpoints. The size peer group of a sample company consists of 
all Execucomp companies in the same decile. I construct size and book-to-market peer groups 
using firms that are in the Execucomp database because these are the most visible firms on the 
market, to which boards are most likely to pay attention. In my robustness check, I use peer 
groups that are constructed using all firms that are in the Compustat CRSP linked database. I 
calculate median buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) of peer groups for the twelve months after group 
formation and use it as the size benchmark for evaluating the performance of the sample company. 
This procedure ensures that the stock returns of the sample firms and size benchmark returns are 
calculated over the same 12-month period, regardless of the sample firms’ choices of fiscal year 
end month. 
The same procedure is used to construct the book-to-market peer groups for the sample 
companies. Based on the book-to-market ratios that are known at the beginning of the fiscal year, 
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I assign sample firms into book-to-market deciles using NYSE breakpoints. The book-to-market 
peer group for each sample company consists of all other Execucomp companies that are in the 
same book-to-market decile for the same calendar month. I assume that the book values for 
calculating the book-to-market ratios become known to the public four months after the fiscal 
year end.  
The performance of the size and book-to-market peer groups can be measured using 
median return, value weighted return or equal weighted return. Value weighted return is not the 
most appropriate measure for the purpose of this paper. In this paper, peer group performances 
are used as proxies for the impact of common shocks. Unless returns of large stocks are better 
proxies for the impact of common shocks, there is no reason to put more weight on them. In fact, 
if the main hypothesis regarding size based relative performance evaluation holds, the value 
weighted market return is most probably an inaccurate proxy of common shocks. The advantage 
of median returns is that they are less affected by extreme values than equal weight returns are. 
Therefore, I use median returns as the measures of peer group performances in my base models. I 
nevertheless use equal weighted returns of size and book-to-market peer groups in my robustness 
check. To avoid mechanical correlations, I exclude own stock returns in calculating the 
benchmark returns. If a peer company is delisted after peer group formation, I invest delisting 
proceeds to value weighted CRSP index so that it remains in the peer group. This mitigates 
potential survivorship bias. I adjust the returns of the size and book-to-market peer groups by 
subtracting the market return, which is calculated as the median return of all Execucomp 
companies. I refer to the adjusted returns of the size groups are referred to as the size return and 
those of the book-to-market peer groups as the BM returns.  
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics. Total compensation is the TDC1 variable in 
the Execucomp database, which is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, long term 
incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Cash 
compensation is the sum of salary and bonus. Following previous research, I adjust the 
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compensation items for inflation based on the CPI data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, using 
December 1994 as the base period. The median total  
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample consists of  CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Total compensation is the the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, 
long term incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Cash compensation is the 
sum of salary and bonus. Stock return is a sample firm’s buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Market return is the 
measured as the median return of all Execucomp companies during the year. Size (BM) return is  defined as the median 
return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) peer groups minus market return. R&D is research and development 
expenditure scaled by sales. PP&E is net plant, property and equipment scaled by assets. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of a sample firm’s stock return over the 12 month buy-and-hold period. Total compensation, cash 
compensation and sales are deflated using 1994 as the base period. To mitigate the influence of outliers, R&D is 
winsorized at 99%, and volatility and book-to-market ratio at 1% and 99%. 
 
          
  N Median Mean Std 
Total compensation 21794 1,848 3,724 8,853 
Log(total compensation) 21794 7.5224 7.5566 1.1502 
Cash compensation 21794 721 1,069 1,571 
Log(cash compensation) 21794 6.5814 6.5962 0.9600 
Stock return 21794 0.0776 0.1287 0.4911 
Market return 21794 0.0738 0.0676 0.1742 
Size return 21794 0.0029 0.0016 0.0742 
BM return 21794 -0.0007 -0.0019 0.0627 
Assets 21794 1,224 9,519 47,608 
Market value 21794 1,097 5,252 17,294 
Sales 21790 930 3,772 11,255 
R&D 21777 0.0000 0.0402 0.1046 
PP&E 21236 0.2152 0.2814 0.2378 
Volatility 21794 0.0949 0.1112 0.0638 
BM 21794 0.4772 0.5713 0.4293 
 
compensation for CEOs in the sample is $1,848 thousand and the mean is $3,724 thousand. The 
median cash compensation, in 1994 dollars, is $721 thousand and the mean is $1,069 thousand. 
Because both variables are substantially skewed, I use their logarithmic transformations in my 
regression analysis. From 1994 to 2008, the median stock return for sample firms is about 7.76% 
per year. By design, this is similar to the median market return, which is defined as the median 
return for all Execucomp firms for a particular year. The size and BM returns are defined as the 
median return of a sample firm’s size and book-to-market peer groups minus the market return. 
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Consequently, their means and median are all close to zero. In Table I, I also provide the 
descriptive statistics for several other variables that are used in my regressions. R&D is defined as 
research and development expenditure scaled by sales, PP&E defined as net plant, property and 
equipment scaled by assets and volatility as the standard deviation of a sample firm’s stock return 
over the 12 month buy-and-hold period. To mitigate the influence of outliers, I winsorize R&D at 
99%, and volatility and book-to-market ratio at 1% and 99%. 
Table 3.2.: Correlation between market return, size return and BM return 
 
The sample consists of CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Market return is the measured as the median return of all Execucomp 
companies during the year. Size (BM) return is defined as the median return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) 
peer groups minus market return. 
 
  Size return   BM  return   Market return 
Size return 1 
 
0.08228 
 
0.06987 
  
     BM return 
  
1 
 
0.0047 
  
     Market return         1 
 
Table 3.2 presents the Pearson correlation between the median stock returns of the peer 
groups. The correlation is 0.0699 between market return and size return, 0.0047 between market 
return and BM return and 0.0823 between size return and BM return. 
 
4. Results 
 
In this section, I examine whether boards evaluate firm performance relative to their size 
and book-to-market peers in deciding CEO compensation. Following Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990), I regress measures of executive compensation on firms’ own stock returns and the stock 
performances of their size and BM based peers. If boards filter common shocks related to size 
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and book-to-market effects, the compensation measures will be negatively related to the peer 
group stock performances.  
Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the results from regressing the natural log of CEO total 
compensation on the stock return variables. The t statistics in the parentheses are calculated using 
standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included. The OLS models 
in the first three columns estimate the relation between total compensation and peer group returns, 
after controlling for own stock return and market return. In all three models, CEO compensation 
is positively related to firm’s own performance and negatively related to the market performance.  
More importantly, the coefficients for size and BM returns are all significantly negative, 
indicating that the CEOs are rewarded ( or penalized) less when their size and book-to-market 
peer groups perform better (worse). This is consistent with the prediction of the relative 
performance evaluation model. In Model (3), the returns of the overall market, the size peer group 
and the book-to-market peer groups correspond to the three risk factors in the Fama French model. 
The coefficients for market return, size return and BM returns are, respectively, -0.2831, -0.9130 
and -0.3154, The performance of size and book-to-market peer groups appear to have more 
impact on CEO total compensation than the overall market. In Models (4), (5) and (6), I estimate 
the relation between total compensation and peer group performance using the fixed effect model. 
The inclusion of fixed effects controls for all factors about the firm, such as average firm size and 
PP&E, that are constant over time. In all three models, the coefficients for market return, size 
return and BM return are significantly negatively related to total compensation. The magnitudes 
of the coefficients for size and BM returns are smaller than in Models (1), (2) and (3), but are still 
non-trivial compared with the coefficients for own stock return and market return.  The results in 
Panel A are consistent with the view that boards make relative performance adjustments when 
deciding CEO’s total compensation.  
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the results using the natural log of cash compensation as 
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Table 3.3.: Regression of executive compensation on size and BM returns 
 
The sample consists of CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Total compensation is the the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, 
long term incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Cash compensation is the 
sum of salary and bonus. Stock return is a sample firm’s buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Market return is the 
measured as the median return of all Execucomp companies during the year. Size (BM) return is defined as the median 
return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) peer groups minus market return. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present OLS 
estimates and columns (4), (5) and (6) present fixed effect estimates. The t values in the parentheses are calculated 
using standard errors clustered by firm. Year fixed and three-digit SIC industry dummies are included. a and b denote 
statistically significant at 1% and 5%. 
 
Panel A: Log(total compensation) as dependent variable 
                          
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Intercept 6.8221 a 6.8412 a 6.7948 a - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
(13.98) 
 
(14.40) 
 
(13.72) 
       Stock return 0.2161 a 0.2073 a 0.2266 a 0.1419 a 0.1389 a 0.1479 a 
 
(11.55) 
 
(11.15) 
 
(11.96) 
 
(9.14) 
 
(8.99) 
 
(9.54) 
 Market return -0.2216 c -0.3196 a -0.2661 b -0.6447 a -0.6696 a -0.6589 a 
 
(-1.84) 
 
(-2.71) 
 
(-2.23) 
 
(-10.35) 
 
(-11.00) 
 
(-10.78) 
 Size return -0.9552 a 
  
-0.9130 a -0.3981 a 
  
-0.3807 a 
 
(-8.54) 
   
(-8.26) 
 
(-5.11) 
   
(-4.94) 
 BM return 
  
-0.7868 a -0.7123 a 
  
-0.3696 a -0.3431 a 
   
(-6.17) 
 
(-5.72) 
   
(-3.92) 
 
(-3.68) 
 
             Firm fixed 
effects 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 R2 0.1469   0.1451   0.1483   0.0792   0.0786   0.0801   
 
Panel B: Log(cash compensation) as dependent variable 
                          
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Intercept 5.8952 a 5.9148 a 5.8907 a - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
(25.73) 
 
(24.89) 
 
(25.58) 
       Stock return 0.1895 a 0.1812 a 0.1912 a 0.1665 a 0.1586 a 0.1650 a 
 
(13.50) 
 
(12.98) 
 
(13.40) 
 
(14.72) 
 
(13.75) 
 
(14.54) 
 Market return -0.2758 b -0.3108 a -0.2831 a 0.0234 
 
0.0203 
 
0.0273 a 
 
(-3.15) 
 
(-3.57) 
 
(-3.23) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.58) 
 Size return -0.4799 a 
  
-0.4731 a -0.2671 a 
  
-0.2716 a 
 
(-4.48) 
   
(-4.46) 
 
(-3.33) 
   
(-3.41) 
 BM return 
  
-0.1545 
 
-0.1159 
   
0.0700 
 
0.0889 
 
   
(-1.52) 
 
(-1.17) 
   
(0.96) 
 
(1.23) 
 Firm fixed 
effects No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R2 0.1595   0.1583   0.1596   0.0860   0.0850   0.0861   
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the dependent variable. The OLS results are presented in columns (1), (2) and (3) and the fixed 
effect results in columns (4), (5) and (6). The coefficients of market and size returns are negative 
and significant in all models, but the coefficients of BM returns are not.  The results in Panel B 
provide support for the use of size based, but not for the use of book-to-market based, relative 
performance evaluation in deciding cash compensation. Taken together, the results in Panels A 
and B suggest that BM return is a relevant benchmark for deciding equity based compensation 
and size return is a relevant benchmark for deciding both the cash and equity components in CEO 
compensation.  
In Table 3.4, I present results with controls for firm characteristics.  The dependent 
variable for the models in Panel A is total compensation in logarithms. The OLS results are 
presented in Models (1), (2) and (3) and the fixed effect results in Models (4), (5) and (6). The t 
statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Year and three digit SIC industry 
dummies are included to control for time and industry specific effects.  The control variables are 
similar to those used by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). The coefficients of the control variables 
have signs and significance levels that are consistent with previous research. Companies of larger 
size, measured by the logarithm of lagged sales, provide higher compensation to their CEOs. 
R&D and book-to-market ratio, as proxies for monitoring costs and growth options, are positively 
related to CEO compensation. There is a negative relation between PP&E and compensation, 
consistent with the notion that companies with higher asset tangibility require less monitoring.  
For the OLS models, there is positive relation between volatility and total compensation. Most 
importantly, the key results regarding size and BM returns do not change after the inclusion of the 
control variables. Both of them remain negatively and significantly related to total compensation. 
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents estimation results for cash compensation. Consistent with previous 
research, there appear to be a negative relation between volatility and cash compensation. The 
coefficients for other control variables are similar to those in Panel A. More importantly, the 
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results regarding size and BM returns are similar to those presented in Table 3.3. CEOs’ cash 
compensation is negatively and significantly related to size return, but not to BM return.  
Table 3.4.: Regression of executive compensation on size return, BM return and control variables 
 
The sample consists of CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Total compensation is the the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, 
long term incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Cash compensation is the 
sum of salary and bonus. Stock return is a sample firm’s buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Market return is the 
measured as the median return of all Execucomp companies during the year. Size (BM) return is defined as the median 
return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) peer groups minus market return. R&D is defined as research and 
development expenditure scaled by sales, PP&E defined as net plant, property and equipment scaled by assets and 
volatility as the standard deviation of a sample firm’s stock return over the 12 month buy-and-hold period. To mitigate 
the influence of outliers, I winsorize R&D at 99%, and volatility and book-to-market ratio at 1% and 99%.Columns (1), 
(2) and (3) present OLS estimates and columns (4), (5) and (6) present fixed effect estimates. The t values in the 
parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Year fixed and three-digit SIC industry dummies are 
included. a and b denote statistically significant at 1% and 5%. 
 
Panel A: Log(total compensation) as dependent variable 
                          
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Intercept 3.5922 
a
 3.6159 
a
 3.5842 
a
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
(25.87) 
 
(27.03) 
 
(25.38) 
       
Stock return 0.1535 
a
 0.1472 
a
 0.1594 
a
 0.1012 
a
 0.0994 
a
 0.1071 
a
 
 
(8.39) 
 
(8.12) 
 
(8.76) 
 
(6.00) 
 
(5.89) 
 
(6.36) 
 
Market return -0.3194 
a
 -0.3743 
a
 -0.3402 
a
 -0.4203 
a
 -0.4443 
a
 -0.4350 
a
 
 
(-2.88) 
 
(-3.42) 
 
(-3.10) 
 
(-6.90) 
 
(-7.46) 
 
(-7.29) 
 
Size return -0.5256 
a
 
  
-0.5073 
a 
-0.3038 
a
 
  
-0.2876 
a 
 
(-5.98) 
   
(-5.86) 
 
(-4.01) 
   
(-3.84) 
 
BM return 
  
-0.3562 
a
 -0.3154 
a
 
  
-0.3247 
a
 -0.3037 
a
 
   
(-3.27) 
 
(-2.94) 
   
(-3.55) 
 
(-3.35) 
 
Log(sales) 0.4724 
a
 0.4725 
a
 0.4720 
a
 0.3958 
a
 0.3953 
a
 0.3954 
a
 
 
(44.61) 
 
(44.57) 
 
(44.56) 
 
(18.26) 
 
(18.31) 
 
(18.27) 
 
R&D 1.7584 
a
 1.7479 
a
 1.7521 
a
 0.3696 
c
 0.3426 
c
 0.3583 
c
 
 
(11.45) 
 
(11.38) 
 
(11.41) 
 
(1.77) 
 
(1.66) 
 
(1.72) 
 
PP&E -0.3365 
a
 -0.3424 
a
 -0.3369 
a
 -0.9255 
a
 -0.9426 
a
 -0.9278 
a
 
 
(-3.87) 
 
(-3.94) 
 
(-3.88) 
 
(-7.95) 
 
(-8.08) 
 
(-7.98) 
 
Volatility 0.4839 
b
 0.4213 
b
 0.4613 
b
 0.1311 
 
0.0840 
 
0.1055 
 
 
(2.44) 
 
(2.13) 
 
(2.34) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.65) 
 
BM -0.2594 
a
 -0.2598 
a
 -0.2545 
a
 -0.2528 
a
 -0.2536 
a
 -0.2501 
a
 
 
(-9.00) 
 
(-9.05) 
 
(-8.93) 
 
(-9.84) 
 
(-9.85) 
 
(-9.75) 
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Table 3.4. (cont’d) 
             Firm fixed
effects No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.4444 
 
 0.4437 
 
 0.4447 
 
 0.1444 
 
 0.1443 
 
 0.1451 
 
 
 
Panel B: Log(cash compensation) as dependent variable 
                          
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
Intercept 4.0558 
a
 4.0678 
a
 4.0563 
a
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
(20.76) 
 
(19.74) 
 
(20.74) 
       
Stock return 0.1806 
a
 0.1758 
a
 0.1802 
a
 0.1612 
a
 0.1542 
a
 0.1599 
a
 
 
(13.08) 
 
(12.78) 
 
(13.04) 
 
(14.02) 
 
(13.06) 
 
(13.87) 
 
Market return -0.4085 
a
 -0.4195 
a
 -0.4072 
a
 0.1034 
b
 0.1000 
b
 0.1068 
b
 
 
(-4.95) 
 
(-5.13) 
 
(-4.94) 
 
(2.10) 
 
(2.05) 
 
(2.18) 
 
Size return -0.1821 
c
 
  
-0.1832 
b
 -0.2055 
a
 
  
-0.2092 
a
 
 
(-1.93) 
   
(-1.96) 
 
(-2.58) 
   
(-2.65) 
 
BM return 
  
0.0051 
 
0.0198 
   
0.0540 
 
0.0693 
 
   
(0.06) 
 
(0.22) 
   
(0.74) 
 
(0.97) 
 
Log(sales) 0.2922 
a
 0.2924 
a
 0.2922 
a
 0.2325 
a
 0.2325 
a
 0.2326 
a
 
 
(27.96) 
 
(27.96) 
 
(28.00) 
 
(9.96) 
 
(9.98) 
 
(9.96) 
 
R&D 0.6075 
a
 0.6064 
a
 0.6079 
a
 -0.1834 
 
-0.1922 
 
-0.1808 
 
 
(4.62) 
 
(4.62) 
 
(4.62) 
 
(-1.33) 
 
(-1.40) 
 
(-1.31) 
 
PP&E -0.1346 
c
 -0.1365 
c
 -0.1345 
c
 -0.4103 
a
 -0.4205 
a
 -0.4098 
a
 
 
(-1.69) 
 
(-1.71) 
 
(-1.68) 
 
(-4.37) 
 
(-4.47) 
 
(-4.36) 
 
Volatility -1.0418 
b
 -1.0549 
a
 -1.0404 
a
 -0.7628 
a
 -0.7725 
a
 -0.7569 
a
 
 
(-6.13) 
 
(-6.26) 
 
(-6.15) 
 
(-5.27) 
 
(-5.36) 
 
(-5.24) 
 
BM -0.0535 
b
 -0.0558 
b
 -0.0539 
b
 -0.0850 
a
 -0.0882 
a
 -0.0857 
a
 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-2.13) 
 
(-2.07) 
 
(-3.54) 
 
(-3.65) 
 
(-3.56) 
 
             Firm fixed
effects No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.3404 
 
 0.3402 
 
 0.3404 
 
 0.1222 
 
 0.1216 
 
 0.1223 
 
 
 
The results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are consistent with the relative performance evaluation 
model. However, they can also be consistent with managerial entrenchment hypothesis if the 
negative relation between compensation and peer group performance exists only in situations 
where relative performance evaluation is more favorable to CEOs.  If entrenched managers can   
106 
 
Table 3.5. Regression of total compensation on size return, BM return and peer performance 
dummies 
 
The sample consists of CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Total compensation is the the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, 
long term incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Stock return is a sample 
firm’s buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Market return is the measured as the median return of all Execucomp 
companies during the year. Size (BM) return is defined as the median return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) 
peer groups minus market return. Sizedown (BMdown) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when size (BM) 
peer groups have negative stock returns. R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales. PP&E is net 
plant, property and equipment scaled by assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of a sample firm’s stock return over 
the 12 month buy-and-hold period.  R&D is winsorized at 99%, and volatility and book-to-market ratio at 1% and 99%. 
The t statistics in the parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Year fixed and three-digit SIC 
industry dummies are included. a and b denote statistically significant at 1% and 5%. 
 
          
  Model 1   Model 2   
Intercept 3.5983 
a
 - 
 
 
(25.58) 
   
Stock return 0.1609 
a
 0.1084 
a
 
 
(8.82) 
 
(6.41) 
 
Market return -0.3482 
a
 -0.4388 
a
 
 
(-3.14) 
 
(-7.26) 
 
Size return -0.6156 
a
 -0.3710 
a
 
 
(-5.86) 
 
(-4.08) 
 
Size return × Sizedown 0.4053 
c
 0.2802 
c
 
 
(1.75) 
 
(1.68) 
 
BM return -0.3183 
b
 -0.2395 
b
 
 
(-2.39) 
 
(-2.20) 
 
BM return × Bmdown -0.0172 
 
-0.1732 
 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(-0.77) 
 
Log(sales) 0.4716 
a
 0.3943 
a
 
 
(44.37) 
 
(18.14) 
 
R&D 1.7534 
a
 0.3599 
c
 
 
(11.42) 
 
(1.73) 
 
PP&E -0.3366 
a
 -0.9249 
a
 
 
(-3.88) 
 
(-7.95) 
 
Volatility 0.4750 
b
 0.1070 
c
 
 
(2.41) 
 
(0.67) 
 
BM -0.2520 
a
 -0.2487 
a
 
 
(-8.88) 
 
(-9.71) 
 
 
     
Firm fixed effects No 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.4448   0.1453   
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truly influence boards’ decisions, they will seek to be evaluated relative to their peers only when 
it is favorable to them. If so, the negative relation between CEO compensation and the peer group 
performances will exist only when peer companies are performing poorly, but not when peer 
companies are performing well. Such asymmetric effects are more consistent with the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis than with the relative performance evaluation model. I test against the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis using the regression models in Table 3.5. The OLS model in 
column (1) corresponds to Model (3) in Panel A of Table 3.4 and the fixed effect model in 
column (2) to Model (6) in Panel A of Table 3.4. Both models in include the interaction term 
between size return and sizedown and that between BM return and BMdown). Sizedown 
(BMdown) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when size (BM) peer groups have 
negative stock returns and 0 otherwise. It is beneficial to the CEO to evaluate them relative to 
their size and BM peer groups when these peer groups generate negative stock performance. If 
the managerial entrenchment hypothesis holds, CEOs will be rewarded more for the poor 
performances of their size and BM peers than they are punished for the good performances of 
their peers. In other words, the interaction terms will be significantly negatively related to CEO 
compensation. Inconsistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the coefficient for Size 
return × Sizedown is positive. Although the coefficient for BM return × BMdown is negative, it is 
not significant at conventional significance levels.  Overall, the results in Table 3.5 show no 
evidence that CEOs are rewarded more for the bad performances of their size and BM peers than 
they are punished for the good performances of these firms. This is more consistent with the 
relative performance evaluation model than with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. 
 
5. Robustness check 
 
First, I check whether the results regarding size and book-to-market based relative 
performance evaluation are robust to the use of alternative measures of peer group performance. 
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In Section 4, I use the median returns of all Execucomp firms that are in the same size or book-to-
market deciles as measures of peer group performances. Table 3.6 presents the results of OLS 
regression of CEOs’ total compensation on alternative measures of peer group stock 
performances. The size and BM returns in Table 3.6 are the equal weighted returns of all CRSP 
firms, rather than just Execucomp firm, in the same size or book-to-market decile as the sample 
firm minus equal weighted market return. The size and book-to-market decile memberships are 
based on firms’ market value of equity and book-to-market ratio that are known at the beginning 
of the fiscal year.  In Models (1), (2) and (3), I examine the relation between CEOs’ total 
compensation and the equal weighted returns of firms’ size and book-to-market peer groups. In 
all three models, the coefficients for size and BM returns are negative and significant at 1% 
significance levels. Model (4) includes the equal weighted returns of firms’ three-digit SIC 
industries minus equal weighted market return as a control variable. Consistent with the findings 
by Barro and Barro (1990), Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992), and Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999), the coefficient for industry return is positive and significant at 1% significance 
level. According to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), the positive relation between CEOs’ total 
compensation and industry return is driven by the need to soften product market competition. 
More importantly, after controlling for industry returns, the coefficients for size and BM returns 
remain consistent with the prediction of the relative performance evaluation model. Both of them 
are still significantly negatively related to CEOs’ total compensation. 
Next, I examine whether my main results are robust to the inclusion of various corporate 
governance variables. Previous research shows that firms’ corporate governance practices affect 
executive compensation.  The models in Table 3.7 include various corporate governance variables, 
such as log(board size), insider directors as a percentage of board and corporate governance index. 
Board size and insider percentage are calculated using data from the Risk Metrics Directors such 
as log(board size), insider directors as a percentage of board and corporate governance index. 
Board size and insider percentage are calculated using data from the Risk Metrics Directors 
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database. Corporate governance index is from the Risk Metric Corporate Governance database. 
The data requirement for the governance 
Table 3.6.: Regression of total compensation on equal weighted returns 
 
The sample consists of CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, long 
term incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Stock return is a sample firm’s 
buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Market return is the equal weighted CRSP return. Size (BM) return is defined 
equal weighted return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) peer groups minus market return. Industry return is the 
equal weighted return of firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry minus equal weighted market return. R&D is research 
and development expenditure scaled by sales. PP&E is net plant, property and equipment scaled by assets. Volatility is 
the standard deviation of a sample firm’s stock return over the 12 month buy-and-hold period.  R&D is winsorized at 
99%, and volatility and book-to-market ratio at 1% and 99%. The t values in the parentheses are calculated using 
standard errors clustered by firm. Year fixed and three-digit SIC industry dummies are included. a and b denote 
statistically significant at 1% and 5%. 
 
                  
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Intercept 4.7486 
a
 5.1013 
a
 4.1511 
a
 3.9404 
a
 
 
(4.76) 
 
(4.93) 
 
(39.89) 
 
(19.67) 
 
Stock return 0.1696 
a
 0.1724 
a
 0.1605 
a
 0.1642 
a
 
 
(6.86) 
 
(6.98) 
 
(6.41) 
 
(5.69) 
 
Market return -0.3946 
a
 -0.4049 
a
 -0.3049 
a
 -0.4119 
a
 
 
(-3.30) 
 
(-3.39) 
 
(-2.70) 
 
(-3.26) 
 
Size return -0.4966 
a
 
  
-0.5512 
a
 -0.5729 
a
 
 
(-4.75) 
   
(-5.33) 
 
(-5.03) 
 
BM return -0.2544 
b
 -0.2541 
b
 -0.3039 
b
 -0.2718 
b
 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-2.42) 
 
(-1.97) 
 
Board size 0.1025 
     
0.0740 
 
 
(1.56) 
     
(1.03) 
 
%Insider 
  
-0.5727 
a
 
  
-0.4322 
a
 
   
(-4.12) 
   
(-2.82) 
 
Gindex 
    
0.0189 
a
 0.0113 
b
 
     
(3.55) 
 
(1.99) 
 
Log(sales) 0.4656 
a
 0.4647 
a
 0.4718 
a
 0.4628 
a
 
 
(33.89) 
 
(39.20) 
 
(38.34) 
 
(31.15) 
 
R&D 1.5616 
a
 1.5304 
a
 1.7285 
a
 1.6483 
a
 
 
(8.51) 
 
(8.43) 
 
(10.40) 
 
(8.62) 
 
PP&E -0.3784 
a
 -0.3692 
a
 -0.3699 
a
 -0.3803 
a
 
 
(-3.72) 
 
(-3.67) 
 
(-3.82) 
 
(-3.55) 
 
Volatility 0.8142 
a
 0.7765 
a
 0.2710 
 
0.6258 
b
 
 
(3.29) 
 
(3.17) 
 
(1.16) 
 
(2.37) 
 
BM -0.3400 
a
 -0.3427 
a
 -0.2947 
a
 -0.3287 
a
 
 
(-9.70) 
 
(-9.75) 
 
(-8.67) 
 
(-8.75) 
 
 
         
R
2
 0.4564 
 
 0.4585   0.4560   0.4705 
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Table 3.7.: Regression of total compensation on size and BM returns with additional control variables 
 
The sample consists of CEO-firm-year observations with nonmissing total compensation information during the period 
1994 – 2008 from the Execucomp database. Observations with missing book or market value of equity and those 
involving CEO turnovers are excluded.  Total compensation is the the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, 
long term incentive plan payouts, value of stock option grants and all other compensation. Stock return is a sample 
firm’s buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Market return is the equal weighted CRSP return. Size (BM) return is 
defined equal weighted return of a sample firm’s size (book-to-market) peer groups minus market return. Industry 
return is the equal weighted return of firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry minus equal weighted market return. R&D 
is research and development expenditure scaled by sales. PP&E is net plant, property and equipment scaled by assets. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of a sample firm’s stock return over the 12 month buy-and-hold period.  R&D is 
winsorized at 99%, and volatility and book-to-market ratio at 1% and 99%. The t values in the parentheses are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Year fixed and three-digit SIC industry dummies are included. a and 
b denote statistically significant at 1% and 5%. 
 
                  
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Intercept 3.6504 
a
 4.6515 
a
 4.5861 
a
 4.5882 
a
 
 
(28.31) 
 
(53.47) 
 
(52.21) 
 
(52.24) 
 Stock return 0.1449 
a
 0.1370 
a
 0.1427 
a
 0.1279 
a
 
 
(7.84) 
 
(7.28) 
 
(7.59) 
 
(6.40) 
 Market return -0.2763 
a
 -0.1607 
a
 -0.3368 
a
 -0.3199 
a
 
 
(-3.73) 
 
(-2.46) 
 
(-4.50) 
 
(-4.27) 
 Size return -0.3469 
a
 
  
-0.3469 
a
 -0.3186 
a
 
 
(-5.20) 
   
(-5.20) 
 
(-4.48) 
 BM return 
  
-0.2495 
a
 -0.1674 
a
 -0.1964 
a
 
   
(-4.14) 
 
(-2.63) 
 
(-3.06) 
 Industry return 
      
0.0692 
a
 
       
(2.67) 
 Log(sales) 0.4727 
a
 0.4488 
a
 0.4486 
a
 0.4485 
a
 
 
(44.63) 
 
(45.47) 
 
(45.46) 
 
(45.45) 
 R&D 1.7507 
a
 1.7781 
a
 1.7819 
a
 1.7720 
a
 
 
(11.40) 
 
(15.22) 
 
(15.28) 
 
(15.25) 
 PP&E -0.3404 
a
 -0.3188 
a
 -0.3174 
a
 -0.3178 
a
 
 
(-3.92) 
 
(-5.09) 
 
(-5.07) 
 
(-5.06) 
 Volatility 0.5114 
a
 0.5698 
a
 0.6081 
a
 0.6036 
a
 
 
(2.57) 
 
(2.81) 
 
(3.01) 
 
(2.99) 
 BM -0.2624 
a
 -0.3193 
a
 -0.3207 
a
 -0.3178 
a
 
 
(-9.07) 
 
(-11.28) 
 
(-11.34) 
 
(-11.17) 
 
         R2 0.4438   0.3761   0.3767   0.3767   
 
variables reduces the sample size substantially. For example, Model (4), in which all three 
governance variables are present, is estimated using 11,419 observations.  In all four models, 
both size return and BM return are negatively and significantly related to total compensation. 
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Therefore, controlling for firms’ corporate governance practices, the results are still consistent 
with the relative performance evaluation model. 
In unreported analysis, I also examine whether the main results are affected by outliers. 
For a small portion of the observations, CEOs receive total compensation of $1 per year. A recent 
study by Guthrie, Sokolowsky and Wan (2010) shows that these observations may have nontrivial 
effects on estimation results. I thus re-estimate the models in Table 3.3 and 4 after excluding 
these extreme observations. The estimation results remain similar to those reported in Tables 3.3 
and 3.4.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I investigate whether boards make adjustments for the performances of size 
and book-to-market peer groups in deciding CEOs’ compensation. My empirical results provide 
strong evidence in support of the use of size and book-to-market based relative performance 
evaluation in deciding total compensation. In addition, I find that boards adjust CEOs’ cash 
compensation based on the performances of their size peer groups. The negative relations 
between CEOs’ compensation and the performances of size and BM peer groups exist both in 
situations where the size and BM peer groups perform well and in situations where the peer 
groups perform poorly. My findings are thus more consistent with the relative performance 
evaluation model than with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. 
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